160 The Imperial Century, 1725-1825
happened, allegedly because of the lack of barracks.^91 Paul's idea was to intro-
duce foreign mercenaries and a militia system on the Prussian pattern whereby
recruits, on completing basic training, would be classified as kantonisty and
discharged to their homes until required to serve. This, he thought, would have
two advantages: first, 'the men will rnaiiilai11 their lie with the land, and their
relatives will not, as they do now, fall into despair when they leave to join the
service, considering them dead'; second, 'the soldiers, being accustomed to liv-
ing among peasants, will refrain from excesses when they pass through their
villages'.^92 (It was characteristic of Paul to mingle major and minor issues in
this way.) But he fought shy of a fundamental reform of the poll-tax system,
mch as was evidently favoured by his correspondent, General P. I. Panin, and
:onfined himself to the simple notion that levies should be raised at an iden-
ical rate each year.^93 Catherine had refrained from demanding recruits in
1762-7 and 1774-5, but Paul's assumption that such irregularities made the
evy harder to bear is not convincing. The real need was to match effectives
1gainst human resources in a more balanced fashion, and here neither mother
1or son showed much imagination. The only gain, and it was a modest one,
vas the differentiated extension of military service to the non-Great Russian
treas, considered above.
When Paul (1796-1801) acceded he introduced a number of measures which
hocked contemporaries. Within a matter of days he promulgated with great
lourish a new military statute and several other regulations, but none of these
1rought any alleviation in the recruit's lot. One positive step was to set up a
'1ilitary Orphanage with places for 800 soldiers' sons^94 who, in the normal
ourse of events, could be expected to follow in their fathers' footsteps and
ase the drain on the population as a whole. But the practical results of this
1easure were less impressive than the emperor hoped. Perhaps the most im-
ortant change that occurred from the recruit's point of view was a negative
ne: greater emphasis was placed on drill.^95 Even the principle that levies
10uld be raised annually at a consistent rate was not kept to: during Paul's
mr-year reign three were summoned, each on a different basis.^96
Alexander I's principal achievement in this sphere was the establishment of
:cruit depots ( 1808).^97 These were designed to cut down on the high rate of
1sses by habituating men to service conditions more gradually. He also, as we
1ve seen, issued them with sub-standard uniforms. The main object of this
91 Beskrovnyy, Russkaya armiya, pp. 299-300, citing A. K. Bayov, Kurs istorii russkogo
yennogo iskusstva, v (St. Petersburg, 1909), 30-1.
92 Paul to P. Panin, 10 May 1778, 'Perepiska', pp. 407-8.
9J Paul to P. Panin, 14 Sept. 1778, 'Perepiska', p. 416; cf. Barskov, 'Proyekty' and, for a hint
Panin's ideas, Beskrovnyy, Russkaya armiya, p. 302.
14 PSZ xxv. 18793 (23 Dec. 1798); see below, p. 203.
IS PSZxxiv.17588(29Nov.1797), ll,ch. I.
16 Mikhnevich, in SVM iv (I, i). 226; PSZ xxiv. 18125 (I Sept. 1797), xxv. 18646, 19045 (31 Aug.
~8. 23 July 1799)-respectively 3 per 500, I per 500, and I per 350 souls.
n Petrov, Russkaya voyennaya silo, ii. 318-19; Shchepetil'nikov (SVM iv) pp. 135-50; PSZ
c 23297 (10 Oct. 1808).