164 The Imperial Century, 1725-·/825
adopting a rough manner and sticking to the rule-book, so that his subordinates
had to endure a myriad petty tyrannies.^121
The main change in the Russian soldier's professional duties during this long
period was that he had to do more drill and take part in military exercises.
Pur!sts distinguished between ckzcrtsitsi.i, or manoeuvu:s in formation on the
parade-ground, which were regulated in detail in military manuals, and
evolyutsii, or exercises which took more account of the natural features of the
landscape and allowed commanders more scope to display initiative.^122
Around 1800 the latter were giving way to the former, due to changes taking
place in tactics and armaments. Briefly, the shift from line to' column formation
meant that men had to perform complex movements promptly, on oral com-
mand or at a signal on the drum, while the introduction of more sophisticated
(and heavier) weapons called for greater precision in handling and firing.^123
However, the shift was also to some degree the consequence of a mechanistic
way of thinking to which both military and political leaders of the age were
highly susceptible. One general, extolling the Russian soldier for his patriotic
zeal in 1812, remarked casually, but characteristically, that 'as a rule they are
but machines'.^124 A whole mental world is revealed by this frank statement: an
army was conceived of as a precision tool whose various parts needed to fit
together perfectly if it were to function in the proper way. This view accounts
for the many regulations (ustavy, literally statutes) which laid down in pedan-
tic detail what each man had to do in manoeuvres or on the battlefield; for the
slightest displacement or delay, it was believed, might endanger the success of
the operation and absolute harmony became a supreme goal.
Russian military historians, whether pre-revolutionary or Soviet, have
generally blamed the excesses to which this mechanistic spirit gave rise on
foreign influences, notably from Prussia, and have hailed those who objected
to them as enlightened patriots. This view is anachronistic and exaggerated.
The 1755 statute, which laid down many exercises and procedures absent from
its predecessor of 1716, was the work of Z. G. Chernyshev and masterminded
by P. I. Shuvalov (both Russians). It certainly introduced a more rigid and
formal tone, but it was not directly responsible for the army's chequered per-
formance in the Seven Years War. Peter Ill was a fervent admirer of the great
Frederick, but he fell from power before the harmful effects of his Prussian-
style changes could make themselves felt. It is significant that the 'patriotic'
Catherine Il's military advisers, who again were predominantly Russians with
considerable professional experience, confined themselves to changes of
detail. It was they who, in 1763, standardized drill movements throughout the
121 'lz zametok starosluzhivogo': these memoirs, although dealing with a later period, are in-
formative on NCOs' functions and conduct.
122 Glinoyetsky, 'Nekotorye svedeniya', p. 9.
123 Menning, 'Origins'. pp. 79, 90, 97; id., 'Mil. Institutions'; cf. A. A. Komarov, 'Razvitiye
akticheskoy mys Ii v russkoy armii v 60-rh-90-rh gg. x v111 v .', Vestnik Mosk. Universiretu,
;cries 8 (lstoriyu), 1982, 3, pp. 57-66.
124 Lowenstern, Memoires, i. 274.
wang
(Wang)
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