Recruitment and Service in the Ranks 165
army for the first time. Rumyantsev, and later Suvorov, were noted for their
stress on realistic battle training (Suvorov subjected infantry to lateral assaults
by squadrons of cavalrymen firing live ammunition!)^125 but this did not lead
them tn fnrt:'eo the parade-ground. Beth leaders also appreciated thai. 1 iiles
could be damaged by excessive burnishing, and that 'smart' tight-fitting
uniforms could harm a soldier's health; nevertheless their reforms in regard to
dress and equipment did not make a whole world of difference, as nationalist
military historians sometimes imply. These measures were of symbolic rather
than practical consequence. In short, differences of degree, not of principle,
divided protagonists of the so-called 'national school' from those who adhered
more openly to foreign military models, as did the monarchs who succeeded
Catherine and most of their advisers.
The emperor Paul was the first to stage the gigantic parades that became a
regular feature of army life for the next half-century and even beyond. One of
the climaxes in this 'paradomania' was the victory march-past on the plain of
Vertus east of Paris in 1815, in which 150,000 Russian soldiers are said to have
taken part.^126 The outspoken N. N. Murav'yev-Karsky records that 'in Paris
the soldiers had more work (trudy) than on campaign as there were so many
parades while we were there' and that after the battle of Toplitz (modern
Teplice, 1813) no less than three parades were held even before the fallen had
been buried, so that the stench of corpses spoiled the ceremonial atmosphere.^127
The exaggerated emphasis on drill went hand in hand with petty exactingness
in regard to turnout and compliance with regulations. These excesses reached a
peak after 1814 during the so-called 'Arakcheyev regime' (A rakcheyevshchina:
see ch. 12). The purpose was to reinforce discipline, which some alarmist and
routine-minded generals feared had been shaken by the troops' wartime
experiences. In their view combat 'spoiled' soldiers, whom they valued as
much for their appearance as for their effectiveness in battle. Admittedly, they
did have some reason for concern, since the men had first been inspired by the
patriotic euphoria of the War of 1812 and then, on reaching central and
western Europe, had seen something of conditions superior to those in their
homeland. However, the threat of indiscipline was tackled in a crude, unintel-
ligent manner which aggravated the troops' natural resentment at the many
injustices to which they were exposed.
To understand the situation of rightlessness in which the Russian soldier found
himself we have to go back momentarily to the Petrine era. The military statute
of 1716, based in its essentials on current Western legislation and practice,^128
125 Bogdanovich, Russkaya armiya, p. 35. At church parades Suvorov had his men remove
their hats by numbers: Meshcheryakov, Suvorov, i. 92 (Polkovoye uchrezhdeniye, II,§ IS).
126 Bogdanovich, /storiya, vi. 88-92, app. pp. 5-9; von Bradke, 'Avtobiog. zapiski', p. 28.
127 Murav'yev-Karsky, 'Zapiski', RA 1886), I, p. 34, 2, p. 106.
128 The more nationalistic Russian and Soviet military historians have minimized the extent of
this borrowing, but the close analysis undertaken in 1882-6 by P. 0. Bobrovsky (Voyennoye
pravo) shows that Peter's adaptations concerned only details, not basic principles. The 'debate' on
this mat!er deflects auention from the real question of how the statute was applied in practice.