Moscow's Men on Horseback 29
the size of the levy on the southern border at 20,000 men. The combat unit was
the 'hundred' (sotnya) or company, whose chiefs initially had a fairly free
hand in recruiting and remunerating personnel or in deciding on operations.
The scope of their undertakings was limited by the cavalrymen's inability or
reluctance to venture far from their lands, whence they obtained food, clothing,
and mounts. Weapons were not standardized but were simple to manufacture;
some were bought-or looted.
These easy-going ways changed in the early part of Ivan IV's reign. The
drive to conquer the Kazan' khanate was a major military enterprise which
required a greater degree of organization than any previous campaign. The
new tsar (he took the title in 1547) was eager to consolidate his authority and,
according to the conventional view at least, already distrusted some of his
boyars. It made excellent sense to expand the monarchy's power base by curry-
ing favour with other elements in the elite. The rivalry between noble clans was
in part a matter of 'ins' versus 'outs', seniors versus juniors-a state of affairs
which some historians have confused by trying to fit it into the anachronistic
mould of a 'class struggle'.^55 During Ivan's minority the country's administra-
tion had run down and the self-confident young ruler and his close advisers
sought to eliminate what they saw, not unreasonably, as grave abuses that
could not be permitted in a truly autocratic and Orthodox realm. It was not
a matter of undermining the boyars as a group, still less the entire metropolitan
nobility, but rather of strengthening it by infusing new blood, mostly frcm the
provinces, and so rendering the monarchy more secure.
To this end in 1550 Ivan ordered one thousand (actually 1,078) servitors, all
but 28 of whom were deti boyarskiye, to be given estates on conditional tenure
in an area within 60 to 70 versts of the capital.^56 Such compulsory transfers
(vyvody) were a hallmark of despotic rule. They were unusual in Muscovy,
although there was a notable precedent: in 1487-9 Ivan III had undertaken a
reshuffle of noble servitors in the newly conquered lands of Great Novgorod
that had involved some two thousand land-holders.^57 A new judicial code
(sudebnik) issued in the same year removed the provincial gentry from the
jurisdiction of the princely lieutenants, who had made themselves unpopular
with their exactions. Shortly afterwards these governors were phased out and
replaced by locally elected authorities. This measure benefited the gentry in
those regions-and they were fast becoming the majority-where they owned
or held land. Since these districts had to pay for the privilege of self-
government and were soon subjected to tighter control by agents of the centre,
the reform should not be seen as a step towards 'democratization' but rather as
55 Alef, 'Aristocratic Politics', p. 97; Riiss, Adel, p. 20.
56 PRP iv. 581-2, 5%-7; A. A. Zimin (comp.), Tysyachnaya kniga 1550 g ... ., Mosco'W and
Leningrad, 1950. Zimin doubted whether this measure was actually implemented (Reformy,
pp. 366-75); the evidence is inconclusive. Cf. also Smirnov, Ocherki, pp. 407-22; Veselovsky,
Feod. zemlevladeniye, i. 314-26 (where the military security aspect is, however, played down).
(^57) Alef, 'Aristocratic Politics', pp. 83-4; id., 'Muse. Mil. Reforms', p. 98; Veselovsky, Feod.
zemlev/adeniye, i. 290-2; id., Iss/edovaniya, pp. 77-8; Shapiro, Agr. istoriya, p. 333.