Resistance, Repression, and Reform 313In 1816 a new official appeared in the two capital cities: the military
governor-genera!.^85 Both Sr. Petersburg and \loscow remained under military
rule throughout the reign, and so did most border area<;.^86 Th<:> strategic location
of the north-western region (Vil' na, Grodno) explains why the supreme office
here was held by such prominent soldiers as L. L. Bennigsen and M. 1. Kutuzov;
and much the same was true of the western region.^87 The Baltic provinces and the
Ukraine ('Little Russia') were granted civilian rulers, probably in order to
appease the local ethnic-minority elites.^88 In the south-east the Oren burg
region remained consistently under military government, as did the Caucasus,
but in Siberia, which presented few security problems, civilians exercised con-
trol (expect over a strip of territory along the southern perimeter).^89
Alexander I also found it necessary to strengthen the military force at the
disposal of the provincial authorities. In the eighteenth century this had con-
sisted in large part of men unfit for active duty, who were buttressed by regular
units during major insurgencies such as the Pugachev revolt. In 1796- 7
regulars were employed to quell several minor affrays as well. Typical was
their response to unrest among the peasants of Radogoshch (Orel province).
Field-Marshal N. V. Repnin and General (D. P. ?) Gorchakov brought up a
hussar regiment with artillery support and burned down the village, killing or
injuring some 150 persons.^90
The normal procedure in such cases was for the civilian officials of the
district (or the local landowners) to report the outbreak of 'trouble' to the civil
governor, who had the right to summon military assistance.^91 Alexander I
seems to have abandoned (at least in the heartland of the empire) the vindictive
practice of destroying entire villages in reprisal for rebellious acts, and to have
ordered the culprits to be tried by the civil courts instead. But his successor
found this altogether too permissive and had them court-martialled. Officially
such proceedings were to be instituted only when force had been used against
the troops;^92 but this proviso was not an effective safeguard against abuse,
since any tribunal would accept the military authorities' version of events.
Civilian offenders were liable to the same stringent penalties that were meted
out to soldiers who infringed army discipline.
It was inconvenient, and on occasion actually counter-productive, to divert
regular forces from their normal duties to suppress rural unrest. This was one
reason why in 181 I the tsar set up the Internal Guard ( Vnurrennyaya strazha)-
ss PSZ xxxiii. 26496 (30 Oct. 1816).
86 Amburger, Geschichte, pp. 382, 385; VE vii. 124; B&E xvii. 50.
s^7 Amburger, Geschichte, pp. 392, 394 (N. N. Khovansky was a military officer: see RBS xxi.
380).
88 Amburger, Geschichte, pp. 389, 398: this liberalism did not apply to Kiev itself. New Russia,
or the Don.
89 PSZ x.xvii. 20938 ( 16 Sepe. 1803)-on Orenburg; Amburger, Geschichte, pp. 403-4, 406.
90 Dzhedzhula, Rossiya, pp. 166-9.
91 PSZ .uiv. 17801 (12 Feb. 1797), xxx. 23076 (10 June 1808). The procedure became more
complex later: Luig, Geschichte, p. 45.
n LeDonne, 'Civilians', pp. 174, 180.