334 Towards a Modern Army, 1825-1874could be lost for the least mistake. Potential applicants for discharge seem to
have been deterred by the uncertainties facing them in civilian life. In 1832 it
was laid down that each soldier discharged prematurely (for whatever reason)
w;:a~ to be issued with a passport entitling him 'to live whtn:vt:r he wishes in
Russia, in any town or district'.^61
These edicts prepared the way for the reform of July 1834 mentioned earlier,
which reduced the general term of active service by five years, which were to be
spent in the reserve instead. The break came after 15 years for soldiers of good
conduct in so-called cadre units. All these reservists were considered to be on
'indefinite leave' until the allotted time-span had expired; only after that did
:hey become genuine veterans-'on pure discharge', as the decree put it with
Jnconscious humour.^62 Men on indefinite leave came under the civilian
mthorities, but were handed over to the military if they committed some
lffence.^63 They had to dress neatly, shave, and report for an inspection parade
sbor) each summer. This probably did not constitute a burdensome obliga-
ion, unless it involved a long journey.^64 Much more arduous was the task of
·e-establishing themselves in civilian life. In most cases their modest savings
.carcely sufficed to buy tools and stock. Only in an emergency might they
eceive a small grant.^65 Those who settled in a community of state peasants did
etter, at least on paper: they received a land allocation and an annual cash
:rant, and if they were developing new territories were also exempt from most
axes. All this again was conditional on good conduct.^66
The tsar had confidently hoped that reservists would be 'a constant example
o their [civilian] compatriots in exact obse~vance of the legally prescribed
1rder'.^67 But this was scarcely possible if they remained impoverished out-
iders without close ties to their community. On the other hand, it does not
eem that they went to the opposite extreme, as some over-anxious conser-
atives feared at the time, and as some radical historians have supposed, to the
oint of assuming a leadership role in peasant revolts-although there were
1deed a few instances of this, as we shall see presently. In the 18J0s about
5,000 men were leaving the active army annualliY under this scheme. This was
O few either to constitute a security threat or to stabilize the countryside, let
lone build up an adequate reserve.
The state considered that its responsibilities to its soldiers ceased once they
ad been discharged, unless they either had exce\ltionally long service records
r had been wounded (from 1847, those injured in accidents joined the latter
61 11 PSZ vii. 5294, 5524 ( 15 Apr., 27 July 1832).
62 II PSZ ix(i), 7373-4 (JO July 1834); cf. ix(ii), 7620 (6 Dec. 1834). The arrangements differed
ghtly in the two zones: von Haxthau~en, Kriegsmacht Russ/ands, p. 82.
6J II PSZ xiv. 12166 (23 Mar. 1839). § 226 n.
64 Verzhbitsky, Revol. d1•izheniye, p. 39 dissents, but neglects to note that men with 20 years'
·vice were excused this obligation. The requirement was rescinded to mark Alexander II's coro-
tion: II PSZ xxxi. 30892 (26 Aug. 1856).
6S II PSZ xiv. 12859, 12958 (7 Nov., i Dec. 1839).
r.6 II PSZ xvi. 14464 (16 Apr. 1841), § 8.
17 II PSZ ix(i), 7373 (30 July 1834).