An Age of Reform 375
years.^131 In 1859 a minor war scare led to the call-up of some reservists, but the
earlier concession was repeated.^132 The active service term for new recruits was
fixed at 12 years instead of 15; those currently serving had to complete their
15-year assignment before transfer to the reserve (where the terms were not
reduced).^133 In 1868 the period of active service was further reduced to lO
years.^134 In the interim levies had resumed. Of the 1.2 million men enrolled
into the army between 1862 and 1870, over 800,000 were recruits taken by a
procedure little different from the traditional one, which Milyutin himself
characterized (in his unpublished memoirs) as 'barbarous'.^135 The only signifi-
cant modification occurred in 1868, when it was ruled that substitutes, now
known as zamestiteli, could no longer be hired privately, but only through the
authorities; the assumption was that they would normally be veterans or men
due for transfer to the reserve.^136 The practice whereby donors could send men
to the army as punishment was terminated in 1864.^137 As the army's effectives
declined, men in the older age brackets were the first to be discharged. us
In 1863 reservists of different categories already accounted for 44 per cent,
and recruits for only 33 per cent, of the active army's intake, which that year
swelled greatly to face the rebellious Poles and the possibility of foreign inter-
vention on their behalf.^139 This provided further graphic evidence of the
usefulness of a reserve system, even though in practice the mobilization did not
go too smoothly. Milyutin wanted an active service term of only seven to eight
years^140 and put forward a revised scheme for a recruitment statute based on
the principle that burdens should be borne equitably by members of all
classes-that is, for selective conscription. This contentious proposal was passed
to a commission headed by a civilian official, N. I. Bakhtin, which proved. incapable of solving..§ucb weighty questions.^141 Meanwhile another commis-
sion, under General P. A. Dannenberg, was examining, in a critical spirit, the
issue of army structure and the proposed reserve system. Neither body was
under the War Minister's control, and he had to compromise. Edicts issued in
August 1864 laid down that unit strength should vary according to a standard
determined mainly by the state of national military preparedness (that is, war-
time, advanced peacetime, peacetime, and cadre strengths).1^42
131 II PSZ xxxi. 30877 (28 Aug. 1856).
132 11 PSZ xxxiv. 34339 (7 Apr. 1859).
m 11 PSZ xxxiv. 34884 (8 Sept. 1859), §§ 1-2.
134 11 PSZ xliii. 45876 (20 May 1868).
J3S Zayonchkovsky, Voyennye reformy, p. 82; figures in Bogdanovich, /st. ocherk, iii. app. 47.
136 II PSZ xliii. 46002 (18 June 1868); Zayonchkovsky, Voyennye reformy, p. 83.
137 Bogdanovich, /st. ocherk, iii. app. 47; for the practice as engaged in by the Imperial court:
11 PSZ xxxiii. 33619 (15 Oct. 1858).
138 II PSZ xi. 41749, 42776 (31 Jan., 15 Dec. 1865).
139 Calculated from Bogdanovich, /st. ocherk, iii. app. 47.
140 Zayonchkovsky, 'Milyutin: biograf. ocherk', p. 26.
141 Miller, Miliutin, pp. 184-7; Zayonchkovsky, Voyennyereformy, p. 82.
1'2 Zayonchkovsky, 'Milyutin: biograf. ocherk', pp. 75-6. Cavalry units, stationed mainly in
the western provinces where they performed police duties, remained at wartime strength. Cf. II
PSZ xxxix. 41165-7 (6 Aug. 1864).