that Tsitsianov had avoided backing down, which would have encour-
aged "Asiatic arrogance."^36
The degraded position of Islam in Elizavetpol' casts some light on
the religious aspect of relations between Russia and the east Caucasian
Muslims, a problem that has generally been underestimated by Euro-
pean observers. When Consul Skibinevskii described the preaching of
Muslim religious leaders in Shirvan and Baku against submission to
Russia, he treated their arguments as scare stories told by fanatics.
Although Russia did not attempt to abolish Islam in the khanates, its
policies in Ganjeh and elsewhere gave the Muslims genuine cause for
alarm. After the annexation of Georgia, Russia exerted social pres-
sure to force Christian women in the new province to cease wearing
the veil, a long-established custom that had developed as the result of
Georgia's ties to the Muslim world. The change was not welcomed,
but the wearing of this symbol of what was assumed by the Muslims
to be a woman's correct status and demeanor gradually ended. The
practice of billeting soldiers in the homes of less affluent Georgians
also led to some problems involving Russian soldiers and Georgian
women. If Russians treated their fellow Christians so contemptuously,
Muslims must have been worried about the treatment they would
receive. In fact, the small Muslim community in Tbilisi did suffer
under Russian rule. They were allowed one mosque, but others were
confiscated, as were the vaqf grants.^37 When these actions were fol-
lowed by the conquest of Ganjeh, it is not surprising that Caucasian
Muslims feared persecution by the Russians.
Russian rule also carried with it the threat of disrupting the tradi-
tional relationships between Muslim and Christian inhabitants of the
khanates by using Armenians to undermine Muslim rulers. Russia's
attempt to replace the Catholicos of Echmiadzin and the offer to
resettle Ganjevi Armenians in Georgia could be interpreted in that
light, as could the removal of 250 Armenian families from Qarabagh
by a Russian detachment shortly after the fall of Ganjeh. Equally
ominous was Tsitsianov's letter to the Armenians of Qarabagh de-
manding that they send some cavalry to join the Russians in fighting
Iran. This demand was made in 1805, when the Muslims of Qarabagh
doubted Russia's ability to protect them from an Iranian attack.
Therefore, the proclamation carried a triple threat. First, Tsitsianov
was calling upon some of Ebrahim Khalil's subjects to prepare for
war without discussing the matter with the khan, thus belittling the
khan's authority during the negotiations for Qarabagh's submission
to Russia. Second, many Muslim Qarabaghis were concerned that
nothing be done to provoke another Iranian attack on their khanate.
Russia's Conquest of the Eastern Caucasus 85