food shortages—but, more important, they failed to learn that khans
and their subjects might have a different notion of their best interests
than the ones the Russians expected them to have. To the Muslims
of the eastern Caucasus, Russia was, at best, a potentially useful ally
against traditional rivals, as long as it did not attempt to exert too
great a control over a khanate's affairs. At worst, it was the arch-
enemy of the existing order, intent on destroying every aspect of
Muslim civilization. Russia's tactics of intimidation encouraged those
fears, but the Russians never questioned the desirability of using such
tactics, in part because their preconceptions blinded them to the na-
ture of the problem and in part because there was virtually no review
of official conduct in the disputed provinces. St. Petersburg set only
the broadest policy guidelines and left great leeway to officials on
the scene, who took even more leeway than their superiors had in-
tended. As long as the local officials produced results, and even some-
times when they did not, St. Petersburg would not cavil over the
means by which the goals were pursued. This broad latitude could
not solve some of the officials' most serious problems. Even the sub-
mission of many khanates to Russia did not mean that the inhabi-
tants accepted Russian rule. Thus, the fighting between them and
the Russians persisted, while, at the same time, Russia became in-
volved in wars with Iran and the Ottoman Empire. The Russians were
dismayed by a situation they did not understand and, therefore, re-
acted with indignation at the outrageous behavior of their Muslim
opponents. Outrageous behavior deserved stern punishment, so the
spiral of mutual suspicion and conflict continued until sheer force
gave the victory to Russia.
90 Russia's Conquest of the Eastern Caucasus