about the 1796 campaign, one chronicler compared it to the dismem-
berment of Iran in the 1720s.
15
Given this frame of reference, Russia's
annexation of Georgia and the establishment of a Russian garrison
there would certainly appear ominous to the Qajar court. Most alarm-
ing were Tsitsianov's attacks on neighboring Muslim-ruled areas. As
another chronicler expressed it, the Russians, having taken Georgia,
decided to take the surrounding territory.^16 In other words, Russia
was encroaching on Iran. The process began with Tsitsianov's ill-fated
attempt to crush the Lesghis of Jaruteleh. To officials in Tehran, this
was an attack on Iranian vassals.^17 The official's alarm increased
greatly when they learned of the conquest of Ganjeh. Javad Khan
recognized Fath 'Ali Shah as his suzerain, was expected to fight for
the shah against the Russians, and was considered under the shah's
military protection. Of particular importance was the fact that the
conquest of this vassal principality was a sudden move not preceded
by any explanation or declaration from Tsitsianov to the shah.^18
Presumably, the silence made such a great impression on the Tehran
court because it implied contempt for the shah and set a precedent
for attacks without warning on other parts of his realm.
If 'Abbas Mirza's army had reached Ganjeh before the storming of
its citadel on January 3, 1804, the Russo-Iranian War would have be-
gun there rather than at the Armenian monastery of Echmiadzin in
Yerevan the following June. As it was, the Iranian army arrived too
late, and, since winter was not usually a time for campaigning in the
area, the army returned to territory south of the Aras. It is highly
probable that the shah would have preferred to avoid war. Instead of
ordering a counterattack immediately, he had his new chief vizier,
Mirza Shafi', send Tsitsianov a stern warning, giving the general a
chance to back down and avoid war. The tone of the letter was self-
assertive to the point of offensiveness. No doubt the desire to appear
resolute and intimidating was a contributing factor in the choice of
wording, but so too was the outrage over Russian harshness in Jaru-
teleh and Ganjeh and the feeling that those actions were directed
against Iran. These themes emerged in Shafi''s references to "the de-
struction by you [Tsitsianov] of promises of friendship" and his
charge that "prolonging your stay in Tbilisi on the pretext of con-
ducting trade, you now extend the hand of oppression to the borders
of Ganjeh and Daghestan." The letter closed with a warning to Tsit-
sianov to leave Iranian territory immediately in order to avoid war.^19
Tsitsianov enjoyed using such language in addressing others but
could not stand to be insulted in the same way. Therefore, Mirza
Shaft's letter, instead of producing the desired result, played into the
96 Origins of the First Russo-Iranian War