general's hands by encouraging his eagerness for war with Iran. Tsit-
sianov's reply was a virtual declaration of war. He characterized Sha-
fi''s reference to him as a merchant as a gross insult to the Russian
Empire that required punishment by the sword. The only way to
avoid war was for Iran to turn over the Bagration princes Alexander
and T'eimuraz, which would have diminished greatly the shah's ability
to enforce his own suzerainty or restore Bagration rule in Georgia.
The letter contained a direct threat to Iranian security:
If you, desiring the good fortune of Persia, will come to your senses and reflect
that neither the empty, grandiose threat nor the Persian army numerous as the
sands of the sea and who fight with feathers, not swords, are frightening to those
who are accustomed to conquer in all parts of the world....
In fact, Russian authorities were rather eager for war with Iran.
The most eager was Tsitsianov, but, as in the case of his dealings with
Caucasian khans, his extreme measures were warmly received by his
superiors. All these advocates of war greatly underestimated the dif-
ficulties and saw it as a way to achieve expansionist goals speedily,
asserting Russian superiority over "Persians." Tsitsianov viewed his
command of the war against Iran as he viewed all aspects of his
Caucasian service, namely, as the opportunity to create dramatic con-
frontations and, in winning, impress the tsar. Tuchkov noted that
Tsitsianov was extremely pleased when the Iranian choice for Catho-
licos of Echmiadzin imprisoned his Russian-backed rival, because
that act provided grounds for war with Iran.^21 In any event, the gen-
eral had virtually guaranteed the outbreak of war by his efforts to
conquer various khanates and his letter to Mirza Shafi'. He also did
his best to belittle the shah in St. Petersburg's eyes, as when he wrote
to Tsar Alexander that Javad Khan had received a proclamation "from
the Iranian sovereign—a name which is sometimes given to Baba Khan
in Persia."
22
Similarly, once the war began, he proclaimed the tri-
umph of Russian arms over the cowardly Iranians.^23 Contempt for
Iranian military prowess was widespread among the officers serving
in the Caucasus and, through their influence, among St. Petersburg
officials as well. Even after the setbacks suffered by Russian arms
during the summer of 1804, a young officer, Michael Vorontsov,
son of the ambassador to London and nephew of the chancellor of
the empire, wrote to his father that Fath 'Ali was known to be an
ineffectual coward who dared not spend much time away from Teh-
ran for fear of rebellion.
24
One of the clearest indications of Tsitsianov's desire for war with
Iran was his vigorous effort to make certain that St. Petersburg did
Origins of the First Russo-lranian War 97