not negotiate a settlement with the shah in 1805. Authorities in the
capital were willing to consider negotiation, provided the terms were
highly favorable to Russia, once they heard rumors that the shah had
been intimidated by the putative Russian victories of 1804. St. Peters-
burg's willingness to make peace was soon intensified by the need to
concentrate all of Russia's energies on the war against Napoleon.
However, Tsitsianov opposed such ideas and persuaded his superiors
that the war against Iran could not be stopped without undermining
completely Russia's position in the Caucasus and, by inference, Rus-
sia's honor. At first, he argued that it was necessary to inflict "pain-
ful punishment" on Iran for all the trouble it had caused in 1804.
Later, he emphasized that the shah would never accept the loss of
the Caucasus to Russia and would try to take it back.^25
Despite its preoccupation with other matters, St. Petersburg ap-
proved Tsitsianov's conduct of the war, including his plan to strike
nearer the heart of Qajar power by a campaign inland from Gilan.
As Czartoryski observed after the first battles, the victories that
he believed Tsitsianov had won demonstrated the superiority of the
courage and leadership of the Russian military.^26
The shah's efforts to enforce his claim to the Caucasus in 1800
and 1802 were comparatively small-scale and eneffective. There
were no major battles; the Iranians did not carry out their plans to
attack Georgia, nor did they seek a confrontation with Russian troops.
Troubles with the Afghans in the northeast diverted troops that the
shah might otherwise have sent to the Caucasus, but by 1802 the
emergency had passed. Military concerns did not keep the shah from
staging a more ambitious campaign in the Caucasus in 1802, yet he
chose not to do so. Only in 1804, after the attack on Ganjeh, the un-
constructive exchange of letters with Tsitsianov, and the receipt of
intelligence that other vassals—the khans of Yerevan, Nakhjavan, and
Khoi—were conducting treasonous negotiations with the Russians,
did Fath 'Ali Shah make a greater commitment to war in the Cauca-
sus.^27 Not until that time did he lead an army to the region, although
he had taken the field personally in the Khorasan campaign of 1799,
1800, and 1802.
The potential for conflict was considerable, given that Russian ru-
lers and Iranian rulers especially believed that control over the east-
ern Caucasus was vital to royal prestige. The immediate cause of the
war was Russia's threat to the security of the Qajar realm.
98 Origins of the First Russo-lranian War