that war.) Although the Ottoman Empire claimed suzerainty over the
western Caucasus and consequently opposed Russia's claim to the
Georgian principalities there, the causes of the war between these
two empires were related solely to European affairs. Napoleon and
Alexander each sought to strengthen his own influence in the Balkans,
and each had a measure of success. While France's diplomatic influ-
ence increased in Constantinople and its military position in Dalma-
tia grew stronger, Russia became more aggressive about strengthening
its position in parts of the Balkans, especially in Moldavia and Walla-
chia. In December 1806, the Ottoman Empire formally declared war.
Russia soon had cause to regret involvement in this war. In the first
year, it tied down 40,000 Russian soldiers; the fighting dragged on
for six years.
These developments had direct repercussions on the Russo-Iranian
War. First, the troops sent to the Caucasus to fight Iran had also to
be used against the Ottoman positions in the western Caucasus. The
gains there were small in comparison with the drain on Russia's re-
sources. In a single unsuccessful attack on an Ottoman border pro-
vince in 1807, Russia lost 900 men it could hardly spare from its
small contingent in the Caucasus.^2 The Treaty of Bucharest, which
ended the war, restored to the Ottoman Empire most of the territory
Russia had conquered, including the coastal fort of P'ot'i (the most
important strategic position in the western Caucasus), as well as Mol-
davia and Wallachia in the Balkans.
Russia's preoccupation with France and the Ottoman Empire led
Alexander to try to end the war with Iran on several occasions be-
tween 1806 and 1808.^3 Russian authorities, who did not understand
the seriousness of Iranian claims to the disputed territories, blamed
France for the collapse of the peace talks. In 1807, shortly before the
Franco-Russian peace, France had signed a treaty of alliance with Iran,
the Treaty of Finkenstein, in which France promised to help Iran re-
gain Georgia. However, the chief obstacle to peace was the Russian in-
sistence that Iran formally cede all the territory north of the Aras and
Talesh, even though Yerevan was still effectively in Iranian hands and
other parts of the region were under no more than nominal Russian
authority. Alexander was unrelenting, and he maintained, "I certain-
ly will not make any concessions, their [the Iranians'] claims are
mad."^4 He also insisted that Russia had to have the river border it
wanted because "this barrier is necessary to prevent the incursions of
barbarian peoples who inhabit the land."^5 The war against Iran was
resumed with another costly and unsuccessful attempt to conquer
Yerevan.
The War, 1804-1813 101