deserters and prisoners formed honor guards at the courts of the shah
and several of his sons. A few converted to Islam, but others who did
not were nonetheless allowed to marry and begin a new life in Iran.
Some were made officers in the Iranian army.^13
The biggest problem with the Russian soldiers in the Caucasus,
whether they were stalwart veterans or disgruntled cannon fodder,
was that there were not nearly enough of them. Troops were allocated
to the Caucasus as a whole, rather than to specific areas of acute need.
This meant that there could be more than 40,000 men in the region
as a whole but far fewer than 10,000 of them in the eastern Caucasus.
The overwhelming majority of the troops were stationed at the Cau-
casian Line to prevent tribes from the high mountains from attacking
the Russian agricultural settlements north of the mountains. After
1805 St. Petersburg would not spare reinforcements and in 1811 re-
called two regiments of infantry and two of cavalry for service on
other fronts. Russia's effective military strength in the eastern Cauca-
sus was less than the allocations, often by 2,000 or more, because of
the high rate of death, illness, and desertion. By 1811, there were fewer
than 3,000 soldiers to garrison the eastern Caucasus and fight Iran.^14
Not only were the Russians few in number, they were also predomin-
antly infantry, by a ratio of about 2 to 1. Therefore, they lacked the
maneuverability as well as the numbers to deal with the Iranian army.
Their maneuverability was further impeded by a dearth of horses for
the cavalry and of pack animals for transporting military supplies.
The strengths of the Iranians were virtually the mirror image of the
Russians'. Even though the war brought the introduction of new mili-
tary principles, the traditional army was not without its good points.
First of all, it was many times larger than the Russian opposition. It
seems to have numbered approximately 50,000 men for most of the
war era, although some estimates range well over 100,000, including
emergency levies. The shah also had an elite guard of several thousand.
The army was mostly cavalry, with each tribe expected to contribute
a certain number in proportion to its size. The Afshar tribesman from
from the Lake Urumiyeh region in western Azerbaijan were apparently
the best. Levies from the sedentary population made up the infantry.
Soldiers had to provide all of their own equipment. Except for the
highest ranks, the pay was very low, which made the taking of booty
essential. Although the Iranian army bore little resemblance to the
tightly organized Western armies of the day, European soldiers re-
peatedly commented on the Iranian soldiers' martial skills. Russians
involved in the 1804 Yerevan campaign were surprised by how well
the Iranians fought. Several British and French visitors were struck
The War, 1804-1813 107