the elite, and the best positions often went to court favorites, who
were not necessarily competent. Commanders were usually allowed
to appoints their own subordinates, and they usually chose relatives
or members of their personal entourage. These people were loyal to
their benefactors, not the army or the state. The organization of the
army, especially the practice of giving a commander the money and
food intended for distribution to his men, minimized accountability
and maximized the opportunity for embezzlement. As in other ar-
mies, there were a number of important-sounding sinecures, most
notably the command of the heavy artillery, (topchibashi] in an
army that had none. The commander of the army (lashkarbashi] in
the late war years was Mehrab Khan, who had no qualifications for
his office and used it for its opportunities to collect graft. One of
his techniques was to threaten to punish officers for misconduct and
then extract from them payment for his leniency. There were some
striking examples of inept leadership by commanders who actually
took the field. 'Ali Khan commanded the garrison of a fortified vil-
lage controlling the mountain pass that the Russians would have to
cross into Talesh. When Kotliarevskii approached, 'Ali fled without
putting up a fight. At first, Fath 'Ali was enraged and planned to
execute the cowardly officer. Instead, he commuted the sentence
to a fine and eventually restored 'Ali to his former office of chief
groom (shdter bashi). There are other instances of commanders
being disgraced briefly and then returned to favor.
26
The Iranians did not take several precautions against the Russians
because they had not been needed against traditional foes. Iranians
did not fight at night and did not expect the Russians to do so either.
As a result, there were never more than a small number of sentries
posted around an Iranian camp at night. Camps were set up without
organization, except that the commander's tent was always at the
center, with his highest-ranking subordinates around him. This meant
that ammunition and artillery were not stored where they were read-
ily accessible, even after the westernizing reforms. There were no pre-
determined rallying points in case of attack, so soldiers scattered in-
stead. At least some tents were made of white fabric, which made
them visible from a considerable distance in the moonlight. No par-
ticular importance was placed upon tight secrecy either. Plans for
a forthcoming battle were bruited about the whole camp and enemy
spies picked them up. These security problems caused the Iranians
problems on many occasions, most important at Aslanduz in October
- 'Abbas Mirza led a force of about 5,000 European-style infan-
try to the south bank of the Aras with the intention of crossing into
112 The War, 1804-1813