officer was liable to have his punishment doubled. Despite all these
measures, the problem was never fully resolved.
For all the reforms' shortcomings, Fath 'Ali and 'Abbas still believed
that the adaptation of Western military techniques could break the
deadlock in the war with Russia. 'Abbas continued to drill his sarbaz
according to the new regimen even after the French left. (He preserved
these units, which he valued for their experience, when the British
organized another Western-style army.)^10
In the early stages of the Franco-Iranian alliance, Napoleon thought
that encouraging Iran to keep fighting for all the disputed Caucasian
provinces would be a useful drain on Russia's military strength in
Europe. Therefore, he advised the shah, "For your part, attack with
vigor the enemies [the Russians] that my victories deliver to you
weakened and demoralized. Retake from them Georgia and all the
provinces which had been [part of] your empire and close the Caspian
ports to them."^11 His attitude soon reversed itself. One month after
the Treaty of Finkenstein was signed, Napoleon inflicted a devasting
blow to the Russian army at Friedland. At the end of June, he and
Alexander concluded an alliance by the Treaty of Tilsit. No attention
was given to the Russo-Iranian dispute. This could be justified formally
by the fact that the Treaty of Finkenstein had not yet been formally
ratified. However, the basic issue was that Iranian affairs had been re-
duced to a minor issue in French eyes. The shah might still be a use-
ful ally in some conjectural invasion of India, but his cooperation
could not be purchased at the cost of antagonizing Russia. Moreover,
the Spanish uprising, which began in 1808, tied down some 300,000
French troops and forced Napoleon to postpone any plans for Asian
campaigns.
Evenbefore Gardane reached Iran, his instructions had been changed.
Instead of helping Iran fight Russia, he was to mediate an end to the
war as quickly as possible. By coincidence, the moment was a propiti-
ous one because the combatants had of their own accord begun to
discuss the possibility of negotiating a settlement. St. Petersburg had
wished to open negotiations as early as 1805, but Tsitsianov ensured
the defeat of that idea. In 1806, with Tsitsianov dead and the central
government alarmed over the outbreak of war with the Ottoman Em-
pire, the tsar recommended negotiations with the Iranians if they were
at all possible. Russia was even willing to waive, at least temporarily,
its unenforced claims to Yerevan and Nakhjavan. Gudovich, who
would not have dared to exceed orders the way Tsitsianov did, was
further encouraged to pursue negotiations by a letter he received from
Mirza Musa, the governor of Gilan and the court astrologer. There is
France and Britain in Iran^129