some ambiguity about the terms Mirza Musa proposed, an important
point since the Russians believed that the shah waived his claim to
Georgia. The original has not survived, and the only direct reference
to it comes in a letter from Gudovich to one of his generals, which
means that the likelihood of misinterpretation is great. (There is in-
direct evidence that Mirza Musa did write to Gudovich on the subject.
Later correspondence between Gudovich and Iranian officials contains
a few references to that letter without eliciting an Iranian disclaimer
of its authenticity.) The Iranian peace proposal seems to have been
motivated by the hope that, with Tsitsianov gone, the Russians might
be more willing to compromise. The tone of the letter, according to
Gudovich's summary, put the blame for the war on Tsitsianov, specific-
ally that he devastated lands subject to Iran: Yerevan, Ganjeh, and
Daghestan (Derbent, Qobbeh, and the eastern high Caucasus). Gudo-
vich believed this meant that Iran admitted that Georgia was not one
of its vassals. However, Qarabagh was excluded from the list although
the shah certainly considered that part of his domains. When the shah
had sought help from Britain and France to enforce his claims in the
Caucasus, he had repeatedly specified Georgia as an objective. More-
over, by 1806, he was dealing from an apparent position of strength.
France was promising assistance, and Russia's Caucasian forces were
in disarray. It is improbable that Fath 'Ali would have reduced his
demands under such circumstances, but the Russians, believing that
he had, were outraged later in the negotiations by unambiguous de-
mands for the cession of Georgia. Although they lacked a common
understanding of the terms, the Russians and the Iranians began to
correspond on the subject of peace. There was no fighting, apart from
a few raids along the border, during 1807 and most of 1808.^12
Gardane was in Iran during that period and worked assiduously to
mediate a peace agreement. He hated being in Iran; the living condi-
tions did not meet his standards, and the climate aggravated a painful
war injury. He begged to be released from his assignment, even having
his wife intercede on his behalf with the Empress. However, while he
was there, he was wholly committed to accomplishing something im-
pressive for France by guaranteeing the supremacy of its influence in
Iran and excluding the British. To that end, he promised the shah
everything at a time when neither his own country nor Russia would
permit the fulfillment of such promises. He declared in writing that
the settlement would involve Russia's cession to Iran of all the disputed
territories, including Georgia. He assured the shah that Napoleon had
great influence over Alexander and would make the tsar agree to all
these demands. He also proposed, as a way of cementing Iran's ties to
130 France and Britain in Iran