British presence. An attempt to put the French-trained Shaqaqi in-
fantry under British command produced considerable friction. Given
the current ascendancy of the British in Iran, the French-trained sar-
baz could not hope to be the most-favored units in the new army,
and their hostility complicated the task of military reform. Financial
problems, mostly related to British expenditures in Iran, were another
important source of trouble. Apparently, some Iranian officers in the
new army embezzled or postponed payment of subsidy monies des-
tined for the troops under their jurisdiction. Since the British officers
made a strenuous effort to end looting, the ordinary soldier was left
with an inadequate wage and barred from the usual method of sup-
plementing his income. Ouseley claimed that the shah compounded
the financial problems by diverting a large part of the subsidy for his
private purposes. However, there is no solid evidence on this issue.
The ambassador's contention was that, before his arrival, none of the
shah's officials had dared explain that the subsidy was other than a
personal gift for the shah to use however he wished. That specific
argument is contradicted by Jones's account of his discussions with
the shah when the subsidy was first arranged. At that time, Jones
explained the precise meaning of the subsidy. Since he spoke in Per-
sian directly to the shah, there is no possibility of distortion by some
intermediary. Ouseley derived his ideas about the shah from Malcolm,
who stressed the shah's avarice, so it is hard to judge whether Ouse-
ley's accusation was based on fact or a presumption of corruption.
However, there is no doubt that money problems harmed the morale
of the British officers serving in Iran, expecially Captain Charles Chris-
tie (in charge of the new infantry), Lieutenant Henry Lindesay (in
charge of the artillery), and Ensign William Monteith (the engineer
in charge of fortifications). All were promised bonuses (from their
own government or the company) for their service in Iran but re-
ceived none and in fact went into debt. All were eager to leave Iran.
Ironically, Christie and Lindesay were 'Abbas's favorites and stayed
with him after the rest of the British were withdrawn in the autumn
of 1812 because of the Anglo-Russian alliance.^20
Despite all the problems, by 1812 'Abbas had a European-trained
army of about 13,000 infantry, cavalry, and artillery (of which most
were infantry). He and the shah were pleased with the results and
optimistic that victory was at last within reach. The fledgling units
had begun to see action in 1810 and experienced some modest suc-
cesses and failures. Their most important victories came early in 1812
in Talesh and Qarabagh. In Talesh, the principal opposition came
from the khanate's tribal cavalry, with only a small number of Rus-
136 France and Britain in Iran