concerned about the behavior of his British ally, which was slow to
give the promised aid and, when Minto tried to remove Jones, gave
the impression of being disorganized and unreliable. Therefore, it was
in the shah's interests to prolong the negotiations with Russia until
the ambiguities were cleared. By contrast, two years later, Iran ini-
tiated preliminary negotiations when it was in a strong position, hav-
ing won the symbolically important victory at Soltanbud and know-
ing that the Russians were hard pressed by the rebellion in Georgia
and the high mountains. On this occasion, the Iranians reduced their
demands, asking for the cession of all the Muslim-ruled khanates and
one Turcoman district of Georgia but dropping the claim to Georgia
as a whole.
In both years' negotiations, the Russians believed that their own
military problems made peace with Iran highly desirable, yet they
offered no meaningful concessions. The only modification was the
temporary dropping of Russia's claim to Yerevan and Nakhjavan,
but that had little practical effect since it controlled neither. In
1810, St. Petersburg recommended using the Afghans against Iran
rather than making the slightest concession. Even the reduced in-
sult value of waiving the claim to Yerevan and Nakhjavan was bal-
anced by a more vigorous insistence that Iran surrender Talesh,
whose khan had submitted to both Iran and Russia and where Rus-
sian protection had been extremely ineffective. Commander-in-
chief Rtischchev tried to persuade St. Petersburg that Talesh was not
worth the manpower it would cost Russia or the damage Russia's
claim to that khanate would do the peace negotiations. However,
Chancellor Rumiantsev insisted that Russia had a claim based on the
khan's desire for Russian protection for the past twenty years. All
Rumiantsev would concede was the possibility of an independent
Talesh with no Iranian involvement. The biggest inducement Russia
offered Iran was the recognition of Fath 'Ali as shah (Russian officials
deliberately called him Baba Khan, his precoronation name) and the
promise of Russian protection. Not surprisingly, both sets of peace
talks were miserable failures. The Russians, who had never under-
stood Iran's point of view or even that there could be a rationally
considered Iranian point of view that differed from Russia's, blamed
the British for the failure of the negotiations in 1810.
Jones was quite eager to claim responsibility since he regarded the
prolongation of the war as one of his primary objectives, especially
since it would help the Ottoman Empire in its war with Russia, some-
thing the British desired greatly. Of course, the Iranians told Jones
what he wanted to hear about the collapse of the peace talks and
140 France and Britain in Iran