coincidentally emphasized Iran's devotion to Britain's interests at a
time when Iran was counting on British assistance. In fact, the Iran-
ian attitude was influenced by the suspicion that Russia would use
an armistice or a peace agreement to consolidate its position and pre-
pare for a new wave of conquest. The eventual clarification of Jones's
official position also bolstered the Iranians' resistance.
The situation in 1812 was different. Ouseley sincerely hoped for
an end to the Russo-Iranian War. He sought to expedite the negotia-
tions by urging 'Abbas, who was extremely dissatisfied with the Rus-
sian proposals, not to abandon peace efforts. He also sent Rtishchev
advice about the kinds of terms to offer. Ouseley was right when he
said that the Iranians would not accept Russia's terms, but he dis-
played peculiar judgment when he suggested that peace could be
made on the basis of Russia keeping all the territory it claimed but
then ceding some unspecified areas to Iran. When Russia rejected this,
James Morier, Ouseley's representative at the talks, proposed an ar-
mistice, the provisional cession of some territory, and the initiation
of new peace talks in St. Petersburg. The Russians rejected this idea
as well, and the peace efforts collapsed in September.^25
After Aslanduz, relations between Ouseley and the Iranian govern-
ment chilled considerably. Ouseley believed that the Iranians had
acted in bad faith when they rejected his peace proposals in 1812,
and they made a similar charge against him with regard to the with-
drawal of the British officers. However, the ambassador played his
trump card—he briefly withheld subsidy payments, thus forcing the
shah to heed to his advice. The ambassador saw nothing wrong with
his peace plan and was determined to put it into effect in 1813. His
first priority was "to assist our good friends and Allies the Russians,
even in this remote quarter."^26 He proposed a one-year armistice for
the negotiation of a preliminary peace treaty. During the armistice,
each side would retain the territory currently under its control. He
further advised the Russians to cede a small portion of the conquered
territory as a sop to Iranian pride. Ouseley genuinely believed that
Russia would see the advantages of relinquishing Muslim-ruled areas
and even Georgia, which he considered an unnecessary burden. Rus-
sia's interests would be served better, he thought, by turning Geor-
gia into an independent state or at least a protectorate. He confident-
ly predicted that the trade opportunities resulting from such a change
would prove beneficial to Russia. If Russia were reluctant, the East
India Company could pay it to return Georgia to Iran. He expected
the price to be modest, the equivalent of two years' subsidy. When
confronted by Russian opposition, he rationalized that such obstruc-
France and Britain in Iran 141