tionism was localized in the Caucasus and that the tsar was more
benevolent. In the event that Russia were unwilling to cede any terri-
tory to Iran, Ouseley felt that Iran ought to be satisfied by the restor-
ation of traditional local rulers in the disputed provinces. He did not
explain why he felt Iran should be pleased by that. Iran's lack of en-
thusiasm for the plan he ascribed to three factors: the shah's insatia-
ble greed, which made him unwilling to make peace and give up the
subsidy; Mirza Bozorg's ambition for himself and 'Abbas, which
made him see the continuation of the war as the only way to perpe-
tuate his importance; and, finally, the Iranians' boorish self-absorp-
tion. As he explained to Castlereagh:
There is a very perverse trait in the Persian character, which renders them insen-
sible of and ungrateful for, all favors conferred upon them; for, being the most
selfish egotists in the world, they judge everyone by themselves, and invariably
impute some latent ignoble or even inimical motive to actions and propositions
the most candid and ostensibly kind and disinterested.^27
Only two years later, after the war was over, did he admit that
Fath 'Ali doubted that Russia would yield any territory, regardless of
promises, and objected to ending a long war without any gains. When
faced by Iranian resistance, Ouseley threatened to end the subsidy
unless his peace plan was accepted. Furthermore, he compelled the
Iranians to make him supervisor of the Iranian part in any negotia-
tions with Russia and the judge of whether Russia's best offer was
acceptable. The purpose of this was to ensure that Iran did not hold
out for excessive demands and in the process force Britain to keep
paying the subsidy.
Russia did not like Ouseley's plan any better than the Iranians did.
Rtishchev vetoed the one-year armistice since he thought it was just
a trick to buy time during which Iran would prepare for a new cam-
paign against Russia. Instead, he demanded a fifty-day armistice
during which the preliminary peace treaty would be signed on the
basis of the terms proposed by Russia. No territorial concessions
would be made in that treaty. Not until later would an Iranian am-
bassador be allowed to go to St. Petersburg to ask the tsar to cede
some territory. Rtishchev thought that Alexander, as a compassion-
ate man, would probably accede to the Iranian request. He even
agreed to sign an agreement to that effect, although it had to be sep-
arate from the treaty. However, it is doubtful that by the time he
signed the article he believed that any territorial concession would be
made since he had learned that Rumiantsev was unhappy about the
whole idea and especially about Ouseley's role in this matter. There142 France and Britain in Iran