article but showed what concerns lay behind this emphasis on the de-
fensive nature of the pact: Britain as well as Iran and Russia would
decide what the Russo-Iranian border was to be. In other words, Lon-
don wanted to ensure that it would not be maneuvered into support-
ing an Iranian attempt to drive the Russians from the eastern Cauca-
sus. In the next article, which dealt with the specifics of assistance,
that same problem was addressed even more directly. Britain would
not assist Iran in any war it started. There was also a provision that
reflected London's fundamental uneasiness about paying a subsidy
under any circumstances. It specified that any subsidy payments
were to be used exclusively to gather and discipline (that is, train in
the Western style) an army and that British authorities would make
sure the money was put to no other use. London was so unworried
about the involvement of other European countries in Iran that the
treaty even included British assent to Iran's hiring military instructors
from any European country not at war with Britain.^10
Britain had already begun to extricate itself from the unwelcome
burden of the subsidy even before the treaty revision. In theory,
Ouseley had committed Britain to continue the payments until the
restoration of peace—which could be interpreted as meaning until
Russia returned some of its Caucasian conquests. However, the sub-
sidy no longer suited London's needs since Russia had become an
ally in the war against Napoleon. Britain paid the subsidy in 1814
but cut costs substantially by deducting from the subsidy the cost of
armaments and other wares that had been sent as gifts. After that,
Britain stopped paying the subsidy for several years, although it al-
lowed a few officers to remain to drill 'Abbas's army. Morier and
Ellis left Iran in 1815 after completing their assignment, and the sta-
tus of the British mission to Iran was further downgraded. Matters
were left in the hands of a charge d'affaires, Major Henry Willock,
Ouseley's aide-de-camp, while London laid the groundwork for put-
ting relations with Iran under the jurisdiction of the governor-general
in Bengal, a change accomplished in 1824. Subsidy arrears were paid
at this time as a way of inducing the shah to accept an ambassador
from the East India Company instead of London. The transition was
rough nonetheless, and it was not until 1826 that the governor-general
allowed his ambassador to journey to Iran. As the border dispute be-
tween Iran and Russia intensified, the company's ambassador, John
Macdonald (Kinneir), tried without success to mediate. British diplo-
mats in Iran disagreed on whether the Russian occupation of the
north shore of Lake Gokcha constituted an invasion, but London
was certain that it did not. In 1826, when Iranian troops attacked
The Consequences of the Struggle 155