court chronicles downplayed the prince's role in starting the second
war, not a surprising decision since the war ended so badly for Iran.
Ironically, the possibility of Russian aggression in the Lake Gokcha
incident was not mentioned. Rather the chroniclers cited the machin-
ations of refugee khans (of Baku, Shirvan, and Qarabagh) and the
declaration of a holy war against Russia by some of the most presti-
gious Shia leaders, who acted in response to stories of Russian offenses
against Muslims. However, these factors were able to influence Iran's
decision because 'Abbas already wanted war. He made it possible for
the refugee khans to encourage anti-Russian activities in their former
domains because he stationed those men in districts close to the bor-
der for that very purpose. Similarly, the prince encouraged rumors
of Russian outrages and hoped to obtain a declaration of holy war
from Shia leaders as a way of pressuring his father into war and mo-
bilizing popular support as well. Even after the reduction in British aid
in 1815, 'Abbas kept up his Western-style army (including Russian
deserter units) as best he could. The task was not easy. A cholera epi-
demic during the early 1820s took a heavy toll on his army and the
population of Azerbaijan as a whole. The biggest problem was finan-
cial in that he had to pay the new army's expenses with the revenues
of Azerbaijan alone; the subsidy was cut off and the shah refused to
contribute. This meant that the arsenal was neglected and the troops
were underpaid and were only called up for training sporadically.
Despite everything, 'Abbas was confident that his new army would
bring him victory. He was also encouraged by the intensity of anti-
Russian sentiment among inhabitants of the lost provinces. In con-
versations with British officials, he was quite open about his eagerness
for war. Then in 1826 came news of Alexander's death the preceding
year and the attempted coup by the Decembrists. The rumors did
not make clear that this loosely organized group of reform-minded
nobles had already been defeated by January 1826. This seemed to
be the ideal time to strike at a weakened foe. At last Fath 'Ali con-
sented to authorize a war.^13
The second war exhibited many of the same characteristics as the
first. The most striking difference was that the second was much
shorter, lasting a mere fifteen months. The Russian army suffered
again from insufficient manpower and uneven leadership, especially
in the early stages. The Iranian army was weakened by rivalries among
tribes, between the traditional and Western-style armies (both 'Abbas's
and some of the shah's infantry), and between 'Abbas and Hosein
Qoli Khan of Yerevan. Most of the burden of financing the war fell
on Azerbaijan, the inhabitants of which became increasingly resent-
The Consequences of the Struggle 157