on the frontier were able to mold considerably opinion in St. Peters-
burg. They could portray their blunders as an enemy's wickedness
or pass along misinformation that they themselves believed. Most
important, they could use their position to do more or less what they
wished, to create situations to enhance their military reputation or
settle personal grievances and present St. Petersburg with a fait ac-
compli. The usual reaction of the central authorities was to praise
any such action that succeeded or that could be blamed on Asian
treachery when it failed, thereby encouraging border officials to
continue their methods of operation.
Russia launched its expansionist policy just at the time when a
reunited Iranian state began an expansionist policy of its own. The
Qajar dynasty did not consider its own actions as at all expansionist.
Rather, the new government believed that it was continuing the re-
unification process it had begun with the extension of its authority
beyond its power base along the southeast Caspian coast. The ac-
quisition of the territory in the eastern Caucasus was especially sig-
nificant to a government that already controlled the Iranian plateau
because those northwestern marches had once been prosperous do-
minions of the Safavis. Even though the Safavis had been vanquished,
Iranians still thought of legitimizing authority gained through force
by association with some aspect of Safavi prestige. One way to do
that was to claim to restore Iran to its Safavi dimensions. This put
Iran on a collision course with Russian expansion. The way Russia
pursued its objectives intensified Iranian opposition by appearing to
threaten Qajar sovereignty over the central provinces as well. For
several years, neither side seemed able to win. Then the weaknesses
of Iranian methods of organizing and fighting a war combined with
the disruptive effects of military reform to give victory to the Rus-
sians. When Iran attempted to recoup its losses in a second war, the
Russian victory was even more decisive. The Iranian government was
left defeated, humiliated, and less capable than ever to deal with the
great challenges of a rapidly changing world. A long process of decline
had begun, and its aftermath is with us still.
The inhabitants of the disputed provinces viewed this imperial
conflict with at best cautious optimism. A few rulers, such as the last
two kings of Georgia and the khan of Ganjeh, believed that one or
the other empire would be a valuable ally against traditional rivals.
More often, Caucasian rulers did not welcome the encroachments of
either empire but, since they could not alter the fact, tried instead to
turn it to advantage by seeking the most favorable alliance possible.
This meant the preservation of autonomy to the greatest extent per-
164 Conclusions