mitted and favored treatment at the expense of traditional rivals.
What all the rulers found, even when they were initially well disposed
toward Russia, was that Russian sovereignty was much more restric-
tive than the traditional pattern of dominance in the region. Rulers
who openly opposed the Russians were ousted, but even those who
agreed to Russia's terms lost most of their power and their territories
were eventually annexed. Most ordinary inhabitants of the border-
lands were less interested in the competing power plays than the de-
sire not to be involved in any war. They were wary of the Russians
because of a few instances of attacks on civilians and anti-Islamic
measures, but that did not make them automatically pro-Iranian. The
struggle to control this region devastated many parts of it. More than
anything else, most Caucasians just wanted to be allowed to engage
without disruption in the normal activities that enabled them to sur-
vive. Some tried to solve their problem by flight. Eventually, most
of those who remained became so disenchanted with Russian rule
that they looked to Iran as backers of their traditional leaders to free
them from the Russians. However, this did not occur until the second
war, when Iran's military weaknesses doomed it to defeat once Rus-
sia recovered from the initial shock of being caught off guard.
Iran, too, was caught in the midst of an imperial rivalry of sorts.
Both France and Britain increased their involvement in Iranian affairs
as a side effect of the Napoleonic wars in Europe. France toyed with
using Iran as a route of march against the British possessions in India,
something the British were determined to stop far west of the Indus.
Both Western powers were interested in supporting the First Russo-
Iranian War at times when one or the other was at war with Russia in
Europe. This meant, of course, that both Western nations made alli-
ances with Iran for reasons of their own that were quite different
from Iran's reasons for being at war with Russia. Therefore, both
countries encouraged the shah to continue the war and rendered mili-
tary assistance only so long as such actions coincided with their inter-
ests in Europe. When France and, later, Britain made peace with Rus-
sia, support for Iran became a burden. Iran was left relying on assis-
tance that it would no longer receive. French influence in Iran was
negligible for a long time after the departure of its embassy in 1809.
The British kept up diplomatic contacts, albeit on a limited scale,
even after the rapprochement with Russia in 1812. This enabled Bri-
tain to have some influence over Iranian affairs even before the great
revival of British interest in that quarter during the second half of the
nineteenth century.
Even though this era was the one in which the preconditions for
Conclusions 165