the "great game" were set, it is extremely important to note how dif-
ferent this formative period was from the later one. It is arguable
that there was no Russian drive toward India, notwithstanding British
fears on one, even during the "great game." It is certain that there
was none during the formative period. Paul's attempt to conquer In-
dia was a temporary aberration motivated not by an ongoing obses-
sion with India but by a specific crisis in Europe—the British threat
to Russia in the Baltic. The undertaking was, in any case, very un-
popular with the Russian elite and hastened the coup in which Paul
was killed. Apart from that incident, Russian policy makers, includ-
ing Paul, were interested in using parts of Iran and its borderlands to
imitate the operations of the East India Company in the Subconti-
nent, not in trying to conquer those holdings via Iran or any other
route. Most British officials during this era did not partake of the
"great game" mentality either. Some, especially those in the compa-
ny's service in India, were quick to see threats from many quarters,
including Russia. However, this view did not hold sway in the highest
councils. Britain sent embassies to Iran during this era because it was
afraid of the French threat. When the French threat had passed and
Russia broke with France, Britain relegated its involvement in Iranian
affairs to a secondary plane, where it remained for roughly half a
century. Only one element of the "great game" was obvious as early
as 1828—the decreased ability of the Iranian government to govern
the nation.
166 Conclusions