34 Russian Expansion under Catherine the Great
Russia next had the opportunity to recoup its losses on the south-
western coast of the Caspian. The ruler of Gilan, Hedayatollah, was a
rival of Aqa Mohammad's. When the latter attempted the conquest
of Gilan in 1785, Hedayatollah asked for Russian help. However,
Russia, as it would often do in the future, required compliance with
extensive demands before it would protect a khan. In this case, the
most provocative demand was for the cession of the port city of An-
zali. The Russians' actions convinced Hedayatollah that they were as
much a threat as the Qajars. When the expected attack from the lat-
ter did not materialize, Hedayatollah lost all interest in becoming a
Russian vassal. At this point, another phenomenon reoccurred: con-
trol of affairs slipped out of the hands of higher officials. The consul
in Anzali (Skilichii), with the aid of his predecessor (Tumanovskii),
conspired to bring Gilan under Russian suzerainty and destroy Hed-
ayatollah. Skilichii considered Hedayatollah a typical Iranian, "inso-
lent and uncouth; he does not understand gentleness and has grown
arrogant because until now he has not been punished."^22 The consul
and former consul encouraged Aqa Mohammad to conquer Gilan in
1786 and gave him Russian weapons to facilitate his conquest of the
province. The besieged Hedayatollah eventually became sufficiently
desperate to agree to all Russia's demands of the preceding year but
could obtain no help from Skilichii and Tumanovskii except the of-
fer of asylum after his defeat. When Hedayatollah took refuge on a
Russian ship, the Russians turned him over to another local ruler, a
long-time enemy, who killed him. Gregory Potemkin was displeased
with the officials' actions in Gilan when he first learned of these de-
velopments. However, the consul and former consul soon persuaded
Potemkin to accept their grossly distorted account of events. Their
account portrayed Hedayatollah as a treacherous enemy of Russia;
they did not disclose their own provocations. As was often the case in
Russia's dealings with Iran, preconceived notions of Asiatic barbarism
and the dearth of alternate sources of information meant that higher
ranking officials lacked the inclination or the means to scrutinize
their subordinates' reports.
While Aqa Mohammad's power was on the rise in the parts of Iran
in which Russia was interested, Russian officials repeatedly missed
the opportunity to improve relations with him. During the 1780s
he still had many rivals to defeat before he could claim the throne of
Iran. Russian cooperation could have been an asset; Russian hostility,
yet another obstacle. The year after he expelled Voinovich, he sent
an ambassador to St. Petersburg with a message of good will. Cather-
ine refused to receive the ambassador, stating that she did not regard