a Russian garrison in Georgia as a potential menace, but in the end he
decided it was more prudent to try to ingratiate himself with Russian
authorities. This time the negotiations failed. The reason for the fail-
ure lay once again in the Russians' fundamental biases. The problem
reemerged many times as Russia took control of the eastern Caucasus.
Many Caucasian Muslims perceived the bias and became increasingly
mistrustful of Russia's proclaimed benevolence. However, the Rus-
sians did not understand the nature of the problem and viewed the
Muslims' uncooperativeness as contumely. In the case of Qarabagh,
the specific problem was that the Russian negotiator gave the impres-
sion that he would as soon have conquered the khanate as negotiate
its submission. In fact, that is exactly what Prince Potemkin and his
grandnephew Paul, who as commander of Russian forces in the north-
ern Caucasus communicated directly with Ebrahim Khalil, really
wanted. When the khan tried to begin negotiations, he found that the
Russians treated him very differently from King Erekle. In the khan's
case, no genuine negotiations would be allowed; he had to submit un-
conditionally and accept whatever terms Russia imposed. Moreover,
Paul Potemkin made clear he would take Erekle's side in any dispute
with Ebrahim Khalil and at the same time communicated with Qara-
bagh's Armenian inhabitants behind the khan's back. When Ebrahim
Khalil sought some reassurance that Russia's interest was not hostile,
the younger Potemkin rebuffed him, threatening to conquer Qara-
bagh unless the khan submitted immediately. No military action was
taken since Catherine opposed it, and Ebrahim Khalil kept trying to
initiate negotiations. His last letter to Paul Potemkin was sent in
1784, and he received no reply.^25
There was no Russian military activity in the eastern Caucasus at
that time or for the next decade, because Catherine did not give her
ambitions in that part of Asia a sufficiently high priority to justify
diverting resources from more urgent problems. In fact, when she
finally did order the conquest of Iran, she was once again reacting to
an outside stimulus rather than taking the initiative to realize her
long-range goals. That stimulus was the devastating attack on Georgia
by Aqa Mohammad Khan. When Catherine learned of the sack of
Tbilisi, she was outraged. Aqa Mohammad had dealt a blow to Russia
as well as to Georgia. The tsaritsa had thought that no Iranian prince
was strong enough to oppose her expansionist ambitions, but Aqa
Mohammad had brought great suffering to many Caucasians and had
made a mockery of Russia's promises to protect Georgia. Moreover,
the Qajar chief had to be destroyed because he was a "long-time,
open, wicked enemy of Russia" who might yet pose a direct threat,
38 Russian Expansion under Catherine the Great