also culturally and had a great civilizing mission to perform. In so
doing, it would also become rich, as had the West through trade
with exotic lands. Thus, Russia would acquire the badge of member-
ship in the circle of great powers—"overseas" colonies. This attitude
led to a habit of involvement in the Iranian marches whenever the
status of Russia's domestic and foreign affairs permitted. During one
of those episodic involvements, Georgia sought and obtained a Rus-
sian promise of protection. At the time, there was no pressing threat
and the matter was taken rather lightly by Russia whose leaders
thought of the agreement mostly in terms of its potential usefulness
in some vaguely defined operations against the Porte and secondarily
as the nucleus of a colony in western Asia. However, the factor most
responsible for making permanent Russia's involvement in Georgia
was an event that, by default, was outside Russian control—the sack
of Tbilisi in 1795. From this time on, Russia had to play a role in
Georgia for Russia's sake as much as Georgia's. Catherine and her
advisers quite rightly perceived this attack as a blow to Russian pres-
tige. While some might have questioned whether Georgia's relation
to Russia ought to be closer than the existing vassalage, every official
believed that the continuation of the present relation was the mini-
mum consonant with Russia's might and dignity. Russia was perma-
nently committed to a role in the Caucasus.
This emphasis on Georgia prompted a redefinition of the territory
that Russia ought to bring into its orbit. The southern coast of the
Caspian, where Catherine's efforts had been so unsuccessful, was re-
duced to peripheral significance. Peaceful commercial relations at
Anzali were desirable, but the establishment of Russian protectorates
along the coast was a distant prospect. After 1796, the region figured
mostly in Russian deliberations as a second front in wars against the
Qajar shahs. With the decline of interest in the southern coast, the
economic significance of the eastern Caucasus took on new impor-
tance. That area could become the site of the much-desired center of
East-West trade. In addition to Georgia, the khanates with compara-
tively large Armenian populations (Yerevan, Qarabagh, and Ganjeh)
would be valuable assets because of the Armenians' commercial con-
nections elsewhere in Asia. As far as St. Petersburg was concerned,
these khanates should rightfully become subject to Russia because
of Erekle's claim to suzerainty over them (on the basis of his alliance
with Qarabagh and his attacks on the other two during the 1780s).
Shirvan would be important for its silk and Baku for its oil and ex-
cellent harbor. In fact, all the khanates between Georgia and the
Caspian would have to be brought into the Russian orbit because
Russian Expansion under Catherine the Great 43