he had just appointed commander-in-chief in the Caucasus, that the
realization of Zubov's recommendations was "highly desirable," even
though he did not expect that it would be accomplished immediately.
6
Years later, Alexander again singled out Zubov's recommendations
on Russo-Iranian trade as something his new ambassador to Iran,
General Alexis Ermolov, should try to attain in his forthcoming ne-
gotiations.^7 The younger Zubov remained in Alexander's favor until
Zubovdiedin 1804.
Both Paul and Alexander, as well as the officials who served them,
continued Catherine's practice of relying on Caucasian Christians for
information. When Paul first decided to annex Georgia, he not only
agreed to restore its lost territory but also decided to judge which
territories were at issue solely on the basis of claims presented to him
by Georgia's emissaries. The area included a number of khanates to
which Iran also had a claim and that were actually independent at
the time. Alexander placed greater value on information from Arme-
nians than from Georgians, especially since many Georgians com-
plained of Russian misrule. The Russian-backed candidate for the
Catholicos of Echmiadzin (Daniel) and other Armenians, especially
those who had family in Iran or did business there, repeatedly pro-
vided Russian officials with information. In 1808, Alexander reward-
ed Daniel with the Order of St. Anne, First Class.
Another factor in the continuity of Russian policy was the inac-
curacy of much of the information the tsars received. Sometimes the
mistakes were unintentional, as in the case of Valerian Zubov's under-
estimation of the difficulties of trading with India via Iran. Sometimes
deliberate misrepresentations were made to ensure the victory of a
certain point of view and the personal advantage of the informants.
That was the case with most of the arguments presented to Paul and
Alexander in favor of the annexation of Georgia. The College of For-
eign Affairs, under Rostopchin's leadership, prepared a report for
Paul on conditions in Georgia and, in the process, wildly overestimated
that kingdom's strength. According to the report, Georgia had a pop-
ulation of 800,000 and was capable of raising an army of 25,000.
The implication was that, while Georgia needed Russian protection,
it was strong enough not to be a burden. Yet there was much evidence
available at that time that showed that Georgia was not nearly as
strong as the college's report claimed. On the specific issue of popula-
tion, the commander of the Caucasian Line, Karl Knorring, reported
that the kingdom had only 160,000 inhabitants.^8
Knorring himself was involved in a similar deception when Alex-
ander revived the question of what Russia's role in Georgia ought to
50 Russian Policy: Questions and Continuity