be. The general had a personal stake in the decision, because he hoped
to become the first governor of the territory when it became a Rus-
sian province. He submitted a report in which he warned that, unless
Georgia were annexed, it would collapse and that annexation would
guarantee Russia great economic benefits. When his opinions were
challenged by members of the Secret Committee, Knorring admitted
that he had deliberately slanted his report to favor the proannexation
view and gave the excuse that he thought that was what Alexander
wanted to hear. He added that annexation was not essential after all
and that the needs of both Russia and Georgia could be served just
as well by continuing the old protectorate arrangement.^9
Similar misrepresentations permeated the reports of another "ex-
pert" in the field, Count Apollo Musin-Pushkin, whom Paul had sent
to investigate Georgia's mineral resources and who hoped to be put
in charge of the mines. In his reports to Paul and Alexander, Musin-
Pushkin emphasized the rich mineral deposits that Russia would ac-
quire if it annexed Georgia. While the economic argument did not
in itself determine the outcome of the controversy, it was a contri-
buting factor. Alexander showed his interest in Mu sin-Push kin's plans
for the exploitation of Georgia's ores and at the same time fulfilled
the count's ambition by making him head of mining operations there.
In fact, the mines had been unprofitable for years. Musin-Pushkin
was a singularly unobservant man who believed the mines were pros-
pering when he was surrounded by disorganization, war, and starva-
tion. He ran the mines with a disastrous lack of success until his death
in 1805. Those who followed him produced equally disappointing
results.^10
Even though Paul and Alexander were more closely bound to
Catherine's expansionist goals that they realized, each tsar tried to
begin anew with a policy of his own making. Both were compelled to
reappraise the existing policy when they had to resolve the status of
their predecessors' incomplete projects. Paul had to decide whether
to proceed with the campaign begun in 1796. Alexander had to de-
cide whether to annex Georgia since Paul's sudden death had left the
new province in an ambiguous position within the empire. Even
though it was Alexander who questioned the fundamental principles
of Catherine's Asian policy, it was Paul whose change of methods
came nearer to altering the nature of Russia's involvement in the east-
ern Caucasus and Iran. Paul chose to recognize that there were prob-
lems with Russia's conduct in Asia. Alexander asked searching ques-
tions, but, when the answers indicated that there were problems, he
chose to shut himself off from the distressing information.
Russian Policy: Questions and Continuity 51