his methods of achieving them certainly were. One of his first official
acts was to recall the Zubov expedition, not only because the project
was connected with the circle of Catherine's favorites so personally
loathsome to him but also because he rightly perceived what those
favorites refused to admit—that the expedition had been ill-conceived
and incompetently executed.
13
He followed this first step by endeav-
oring to change the whole tone of Russia's dealings with Iran and
the Caucasian states from intimidation to cooperation. This change
of tactic was not simply an indication that Paul was uninterested in
affairs in that quarter. On the contrary, his statements and actions
throughout his reign show how much he believed Russia could gain
from involvement there. Moreover, this restraint in the use of force
was more than an expedient necessitated by more pressing demands
on Russian resources elsewhere. Paul began his reign with the deter-
mination to keep Russia out of war. Once the Zubov expedition
was recalled, Russia was at peace, and Paul set about improving re-
lations with France, Britain, and the Porte. For the rest of his reign,
he followed a consistent policy toward the Caucasus and Iran, re-
gardless of whether he was at war elsewhere. His cautiousness in the
matter of adding Caucasian territory to his empire was part of his
basic diplomatic outlook in which service of a higher good was put
ahead of self-interest. He adhered to this policy in the idealistic cru-
sading spirit he brought to the War of the Second Coalition, and
there can be no question of the seriousness of his commitment in
that undertaking. Paul's diplomacy was guided by what Norman
Saul has described as an "acute, though sometimes unbalanced,
sense of justice."^14 In dealing with the Caucasus and Iran, that
sense of justice showed remarkable balance, especially when com-
pared with the actions of his mother or his son.
Although Paul's east Caucasian policy centered on the Georgians
and Armenians, he also tried to win the good will of the region's
Muslims. He took Georgia's side in territorial disputes, but he want-
ed to be certain that the Tbilisi government treated its Muslim
neighbors fairly. Catherine had deliberately kept aloof from Cau-
casian and Iranian Muslims. Even her candidate for the Iranian
throne, Morteza Qoli Khan, was denied permission to journey to
St. Petersburg and was kept in southeastern Russia throughout his
years of waiting to be made shah. When Ebrahim Khalil Khan of
Qarabagh had tried to negotiate the terms of his submission to Rus-
sia in 1783, he was brusquely informed that the only permissible
course of action was for him to wait for Catherine to grant him
whatever terms she thought best. In contrast, Paul favored closer
Russian Policy: Questions and Continuity 53