contact with the Muslims of this region. Six months after his acces-
sion, he granted an audience to a representative of Ebrahim Khalil
and sent a cordial letter to the khan. Later, when the khans of Nakh-
javan and Shakki voiced an interest in putting their territories under
Russian protection, they received encouraging replies from Paul's
officials, who assured the khans that Paul was likely to agree to their
requests. The khan of Nakhjavan was specifically encouraged to send
his request directly to Paul.
15
At the heart of Paul's benevolent disposition toward east Caucasian
Muslims was the pragmatic recognition that he would not make the
strategic and economic gains he sought there if he had to fight to im-
pose his authority on khans who did not want to be his vassals. He
had before him the example of Valerian Zubov's difficulties with
Qobbeh, Qarabagh, Shirvan, and Shakki to demonstrate the hazards
of coercive tactics. Late in his reign, when his enemies at home and
abroad considered many of his actions proof of his detachment from
reality, he warned his political agent in Tbilisi, "Do not seek to make
acquisitions other than those who will willingly seek my protection.
It is better to have allies who are interested in the alliance than un-
trustworthy subjects."^16
Paul was unique among high-ranking members of the Russian gov-
ernment of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries in that
he could conceive of Iranians and Caucasians as having their own
legitimate self-interests apart from those of Russia. This realization,
combined with the tsar's desire to keep Russia out of war at the start
of his reign, caused him to relent from Catherine's determination to
destroy Aqa Mohammad. Paul would not yield an iota on the matter
of the two empires' conflicting claims in the Caucasus, but he also
saw the conflict as limited to a few specific, soluble disputes, not as
a fundamental confrontation between the forces of enlightened civi-
lization and Asian barbarism, as Catherine had come to view the mat-
ter. Shortly after coming to the throne, Paul sent Gudovich a very
interesting message to be transmitted to the shah. The central theme
was that Aqa Mohammad's position would never be secure so long as
he persisted in claiming territory north of the Kura and the Aras or
acted in a hostile manner toward Russia.^17 Apart from demonstrating
Paul's preference for deterrence over head-on confrontation, the mes-
sage also showed Paul's willingness to accept Aqa Mohammad as the
legitimate ruler of Iran south of the two rivers and his desire for ami-
cable dealings with those who would reciprocate. This attempt to
find a modus vivendi for Russia and Iran depended on a territorial
concession neither side was willing to make. Unpredictable develop-
54 Russian Policy: Questions and Continuity