ments spared Paul from having to find a way to reconcile that con-
flict with the conciliatory diplomacy he favored. Aqa Mohammad
launched another campaign in the Caucasus in the spring of 1797.
He advanced as far as Qarabagh but was assassinated on June 17, a
few days after the fall of Shusha, by two slaves whose execution he
had ordered for the next day. His army disbanded and a struggle for
the throne broke out.
With the removal of Aqa Mohammad, greater opportunities emerged
for Paul to follow a conciliatory policy toward Iran. The task was
facilitated by the new shah, Fath 'Ali, who sometime at the end of
1798 or the beginning of 1799 sent several cordial notes to Paul.
There were a number of other indications that this was an opportune
time to improve Russo-Iranian relations.
The Russians believed that Fath 'Ali was not strong enough politi-
cally or militarily to threaten Russian interests. In the context of
eighty years of political warfare in Iran, there seemed to be a good
reason for Paul and those around him not to expect the new shah,
who had to battle several rivals, to be secure in his position. (In reality,
the fighting was one-sided and the issue was resolved by August 1798.)
Reports to Russian officials indicated that Fath 'Ali was too weak
to establish his authority as far north as the area claimed by Russia
and that he was preoccupied by a serious challenge at the northeast-
ern end of his domains in Khorasan, which the Afghan ruler Zaman
Shah Dorrani also claimed.^18 To Paul, Fath 'Ali was just one of
several men who ruled some part of Iran. The tsar directed his agents
to deal with "all other Persian rulers" as well as Fath 'Ali and addressed
the shah by his precoronation name, Baba Khan, and the nonroyal
title, sardar (general).^19 Since Russian authorities tried to keep
abreast of current developments in Iran and the tone of Paul's letter
was friendly, neigther ignorance of the change of name—which took
place the year before Paul wrote the letter—nor a desire to insult the
shah suffices to explain the form of address. In addition to the fact
that Russian authorities considered Fath 'Ali's position less exalted
than the latter claimed, they also received information that he might
well lose the territory then under his control. According to a report
by Kovalenskii, a Russian political agent in Georgia, Fath 'Ali's army
was turbulent and cumbersomely large and would overthrow him at
the first sign of weakness. Other reports led the Russians to believe
that the Qajar army, regardless of its disruptive potential in Iranian
politics, was an ill-trained, ill-supplied, undisciplined mob that could
be disposed of easily by a small number of Russian troops. The shah
was believed to be a drunkard who was "not suited to great under-
Russian Policy: Questions and Continuity^55