export restrictions. The official reply to Fath 'Ali's letter was accom-
panied by a number of gifts, including a jewel-studded clock and
some sable pelts. Later, Paul sent consul Skibinevskii back to Anzali
to promote Russo-Iranian trade. The instructions to the consul em-
phasized that he was not to do anything that might antagonize the
Iranians but, instead, was to win their "trust and love." Paul did not
expect the Iranians to do anything antagonistic, but, if any difficul-
ties did develop, Skibinevskii was not to adopt a hostile stance, still
less to call in the Russian military; instead, he was advised to appeal
to higher officials in the Iranian government or, at worst, move to
another location.
22
The most striking example of Paul's moderation in dealing with
Iran was the way he responded to the likelihood of an Iranian attack
on Georgia in 1800. Paul was willing to fight, if necessary, to prevent
a repetition of the horrors of 1795, but he did not believe matters
would ever become that desperate. When rumors of the impending
attack reached him in 1799, his first reaction was to look for a way
to reduce Iranian hostility instead of assuming that armed conflict
was inevitable. With that in mind, he twice sent word to the shah
that there was no cause to fear Russia and that he, Paul, desired only
good relations and increased trade. In 1800, when the Iranian cam-
paign in the eastern Caucasus was imminent, Paul began to prepare
for military action; yet, he sought a way to minimize the conflict or
avoid it altogether. He sent reinforcements to the Russian garrison
in Tbilisi but hoped that the mere report of the strengthening of the
garrison might deter an attack. Most of all, he did not want to jump
to the conclusion that conflict between Russia and Iran was ines-
capable. Given his impression of Fath 'Ali as someone who was in
the process of establishing his authority over various truculent pro-
vincial lords, Paul considered the possibility that the real target of
the campaign might be not Georgia but some other border district
to which the shah had a perfectly legitimate claim. In that case,
Georgian soldiers might even cooperate with those of the shah to
restore a part of his dominions.
23
In fact, Paul was partially correct. The shah's objectives in 1800
did include territories like Khoi, which Russia did not claim, but
they also included Georgia and its neighbors, which Paul would not
recognize as part of Iran. However, Paul was saved once again by
events outside his control from having to grapple with the conflict
between his desire for amicable relations with Iran and the irrecon-
cilable conflict between the two empires' territorial claims in the
eastern Caucasus. That region was not the shah's principal target in
Russian Policy: Questions and Continuity 57