From the truth of ancient chronicles and the records of the Safavi state, I know
that Teflis [Tbilisi] is a part of Iran and a dependency of the nation-conquering
Qizilbash Sultans [Safavi shahs]. I consider myself one of the servants and de-
pendents of the state of the most exalted 'Alid Shah of Iran.^25On December 18, 1800, Paul signed the decree making Georgia a
part of the Russian Empire. Although the decree did not mention
whether the Bagrations would be governors of the province, Paul sent
word that he would recognize Giorgi's eldest son David as governor
if David could obtain Georgian backing. Ten days later, Giorgi died.
The Russian garrison commander acted in accordance with Paul's
earlier instructions by setting up a temporary executive, which in-
cluded himself, another of Giorgi's sons, and a member of the Geor-
gian bureaucracy. This action was extremely unpopular with the rest
of Giorgi's sons, who began attacking rival cliques. The situation
rapidly became more and more confusing. In January 1801, the
Georgian negotiators returned home from St. Petersburg carrying
Paul's message about the possibility of recognizing Prince David as
governor. Then in February, the annexation manifesto was finally
published in Tbilisi, further complicating the situation since it made
no mention of the Bagrations' official position. The negotiators had
just arrived in St. Petersburg to work for a clarification of the new
administrative system when Paul was assassinated on March 11, 1801.
It remained for Alexander to decide the status of Georgia.
In terms of Russia's role in western Asia, the annexation meant
more than the acquisition of Georgian territory. As Paul's letter to
Fath 'Ali showed, the tsar was convinced that all the territory up to
the Kura and Aras rivers constituted a zone that had to be under
Russian influence at the very least if Georgia were to be defended.
Moreover, discussions of Russia's role in Georgia were inseparable
from discussions of the hoped-for expansion of Russia's trade with
Iran and other parts of Asia. In a different sense, the annexation
showed how little connection there was in official thinking between
decisions regarding this region and developments elsewhere. Paul was
concerned about the danger of Ottoman expansion eastward in the
Caucasus even though his relations with the Porte on all other matters
were excellent. The threat of French expansion in the Levant did not
play a major role in shaping Paul's decision about Georgia. The French
army and navy in the eastern Mediterranean had already suffered de-
cisive defeats, which eliminated France as a powerful influence there.
In fact, the removal of the French threat there was a principle factor
in the creation of a Franco-Russian alliance in November 1800.
26
Russian Policy: Questions and Continuity 59