Empire, there could no more be a retreat from the beliefs that jus-
tified annexation than there could be from the annexation itself.
Alexander chose two members of his closest circle of advisers,
Alexander Vorontsov and Victor Kochubei, to scrutinize all the
records of Paul's involvement in Georgia. Their report, presented
to the tsar in July of 1801, concluded that the annexation of Geor-
gia was not in the best interests of that country or of Russia. In
their knowledgeable, well-reasoned argument, the two men deftly
undermined the expansionists' case. With regard to the defense of
European Russia's southeastern provinces, Vorontsov and Kochubei
asserted that the Caucasian Line, north of the mountains, was much
more advantageous strategically than an outpost in Georgia. That
kingdom would be better protected by stationing a Russian garrison
there as a deterrent and keeping the Bagration dynasty in power
than by annexation, which would only serve to provoke Iran or the
Porte. The authors showed how claims of Georgia's economic and
military strength and its inhabitants' desire to become Russian sub-
jects were grossly distorted. They also exposed the fallacies of the
ambitious schemes for increased Asian trade based on a commercial
center along the Caspian coast. Apart from the unfavorable omen of
the long decline in Russia's Caspian trade, the authors pointed to
the high cost in men and money of Peter the Great's establishments
on the inhospitable Caspian coast. Above all, Vorontsov and Kochu-
bei opposed expansion in this part of Asia because they believed it
would distract the government from its proper task of solving do-
mestic problems. The rest of Alexander's Secret Committee—his
friends Adam Czartoryski, Paul Stroganov, and Nicholas Novosil'tsev
—endorsed these opinions.
29
Alexander's reaction to the opinions of the people whose advice
he usually valued was quite remarkable. General Knorring had acci-
dentally hit on the truth when he stated his belief that Alexander
wanted to hear arguments in favor of annexation. The tsar accepted
the opinions of Knorring, who admitted to lying in his report, and
the Zubovs, whose arguments were corroborated only by their repu-
tation as experts, while he rejected the report based on a perceptive
analysis of the documents of the preceding reign. In August 1801,
Alexander made it known that he believed the incorporation of
Georgia into the Russian Empire to be necessary because that was
the wish of the Georgian people and because the failure to take such
action would lead to Georgia's collapse. In addition, he took steps
to ensure that there would be no further criticism of the proannexa-
Russian Policy: Questions and Continuity 61