tion view. Not only did he conceal Valerian Zubov's memorandum
from Vorontsov and Kochubei, he also gave Knorring complete con-
trol over foreign relations in the Caucasus when he assigned the gen-
eral to win over the Armenians and the khans of that region.
30
Thus,
Alexander bypassed the customary administrative organization,
which would have made Knorring responsible to the College of For-
eign Affairs, of which Kochubei was about to become president.
The Soviet historian A. V. Fadeev has asserted that Kochubei,
Vorontsov, and Novosil'tsev all opposed the annexation of Georgia
because they feared that the annexation would jeopardize Russia's
improved relations with Britain.^31 It would be reasonable to expect
some connection between Russian foreign policy in Europe and the
Caucasus. Nonetheless, it is striking how little the major foreign poli-
cy concerns of the Napoleonic era affected Russia's actions in the
eastern Caucasus or its relations with Iran. Kochubei and Vorontsov
minced no words in enumerating the reasons not to annex Georgia,
yet they never mentioned the possibility of damaging Anglo-Russian
relations. Moreover, both men continued to favor amicable relations
with Britain even after they reversed their stand on the Caucasus. Al-
exander himself endorsed annexation two months after the signing
of the Anglo-Russian Convention (June 17, 1801), a major step in
the reconciliation of the two countries. Russia's relations with Bri-
tain remained peaceful until 1807, even though Alexander pursued
and expansionist policy in the Caucasus at the same time. In 1801,
neither Russia nor Britain perceived the eastern Caucasus as an arena
where their interests clashed. In fact, British authorities determinedly
refused to share Iran's concern over the growth of Russian power in
the Caucasus until several years after the start of the Russo-Iranian
War. Even then, Britain was drawn into the conflict not to counter
Russia but to prevent France from gaining influence over Iran by
helping it wage the war.^32 Alexander separated Russia's diplomatic
concerns in Europe from those in Asia, in direct contrast to Paul's
attempt to weaken Britain by attacking India. In 1807 and 1808,
when Russia was again allied with France against Britain, Napoleon
pressed Alexander to join in a campaign, which would also include
Iranians, to expel the British from India. Alexander foresaw a host
of obstacles and concluded that the allied armies would be defeated
by the difficulties of the journey before reaching India. Therefore,
he avoided making a firm commitment by promising to reflect on
the merits of the plan but hoping, in the meantime, to trade his
assent for concessions from Napoleon regarding the Ottoman Empire.
62 Russian Policy: Questions and Continuity