No acceptable concessions were made, and the Indian campaign be-
came a dead issue.^33
In the year following Alexander's decision to incorporate Georgia
into the Russian Empire, he elaborated his policy toward the eastern
Caucasus and Iran. That policy, which advocated expansion in order
to make Georgia secure and encourage trade with Asia, was consis-
tent with the ideas that had developed over the preceding twenty
years. Even though there were practical difficulties in reaching some
of his goals, Alexander held to the same basic approach until Russia
achieved victory over Iran.
During this year of policy formulation, the tsar repeatedly linked
expansion with the upholding of Russia's imperial dignity, as he
would do again many times in later years. He was deeply affected by
Knorring's argument that countermanding Paul's annexation order
would dishonor Russia in the eyes of Europe and Asia.^34 The 1801
manifesto that proclaimed the annexation of Georgia voiced a similar
theme. Even though the words were Platon Zubov's, they were writ-
ten with Alexander's approval. According to the manifesto, Paul had
denied the Georgians the protection they were entitled to expect
from Russia because he recalled the 1796 expedition. Then, Alexan-
der, motivated solely "dignity, honor, and humanity," would once
again fulfill the "sacred duty" of making Georgia safe.
35
Alexander
returned to this theme of imperial dignity at the end of the formula-
tive period when he demanded that Russia's candidate for the hotly
contested leadership of the Armenian Church (the office of Catholi-
cos of Echmiadzin) be supported by all interested parties as a matter
of respect for Russian authority.^36
A corollary of this concern over the imperial dignity was the desire
to humble the shah. During the early stage of Alexander's involve-
ment in Caucasian affairs, he did not expect the shah to be a serious
opponent. In keeping with the axioms developed during the two pre-
ceding reigns, the tsar saw Iran as the victim of recurring civil wars
from which one contestant emerged briefly as the strongest among
the rivals. Accordingly, Alexander viewed Fath 'Ali Shah as merely
one of several regional despots. If Fath 'Ali were to attack Georgia,
Alexander hoped to use the other regional chiefs against him. This
view of the restricted nature of the shah's authority did not cause
Alexander, as it had Paul, to be willing to risk a conciliatory approach
toward a presumably weak opponent. Alexander regarded the shah
as a troublemaker who would certainly pursue an anti-Russian policy
if not kept in his place. Therefore, Alexander ordered Knorring to
Russian Policy: Questions and Continuity^63