conquer Yerevan at the first sign that the shah planned to attack it,
even if there were no indication that Georgia would be the next tar-
get, in order to guarantee that Fath 'Ali had no victories to embolden
him. Alexander also refused to continue Paul's policy of tolerating
the navigation of the Caspian by armed Iranian ships as long as they
did not interfere with Russian shipping. He further looked forward
to the time when his country's merchant fleet would be large enough
to handle all the Caspian trade so that Iranian merchant shipping
could be banned as well.^37
Another facet of Alexander's belief in Russia's superiority was his
confidence that the example of Russian rule in Georgia would per-
suade local Muslims that they should put themselves under his pro-
tection. Part of the attraction would lie in Russia's military might,
which would make local khans realize that the best guarantee of
their security would be the stationing of Russian garrisons in their
capitals.
38
In a broader sense, he believed in the irresistible attrac-
tiveness of enlightened Russian rule. He predicted that, when the
newly appointed governor-general—Paul Tsitsianov—established law
and order in Georgia, people in neighboring khanates would want
the same benefits for themselves. Tsitsianov's first objective
... must naturally be to clarify the confused system of affairs there [Georgia]
and by mild and just but still quite firm behavior endeavor to gain for the Rus-
sian government the trust, not only of Georgia but of various neighboring
states where they are accustomed to see only the cruelty of Persian power. They
will regard every act of a strong state founded on justice and strength as, so to
speak, supernatural. [In doing this you] ought to win their favor to it [Russian
rule] quickly.^39
The tsar's hopes of a mutually beneficial Russian presence in the
eastern Caucasus led him to the conclusion that it was essential for
Russia to take control of the entire region as far south as the Kura
and Aras rivers, although that might involve vassalage agreements
and not necessarily the elimination of all local governments. He was
convinced that only a border defined by those two rivers would be
strategically defensible. Pointing to a map, he told the Secret Com-
mittee that, if Russia did not fill in the gaps in its Caucasian holdings
as far as the two rivers, the border would be too long and too irregu-
lar for his troops to prevent incursions.^40 He also wanted to make
certain that each ruler in this zone followed a pro-Russian policy.
Shakki, Shirvan, and Baku had to be under his suzerainty in order
to establish a corridor linking Georgia and the Caspian. With that
route secured, Russia would be spared the burden of sending sup-
64 Russian Policy: Questions and Continuity