plies to Georgia "by the difficult route across the Caucasus Moun-
tains."^41 Yerevan and Ganjeh had to have Russian garrisons in their
capitals in order to create a buffer zone around Georgia, which in
Alexander's opinion, had no natural defenses near its borders. Ironi-
cally, the tsar was especially concerned about the danger of an at-
tack via Yerevan, which is separated from Georgia proper by the
desert and mountains of the sparsely populated border district of
P'ambak. In the next few years, when Russian generals made two
unsuccessful attempts to conquer Yerevan, they blamed their fail-
ures on the difficulty thrown in their way by the harsh terrain separ-
ating that khanate from Georgia.^42
Alexander's decision to embark upon an expansionist course in
the eastern Caucasus was the first of many occasions when, in dealing
with that area, he allowed himself to be won over by men who advo-
cated aggressive policies. Two of the most important of these later
occasions took place at the beginning and end of his war with Iran:
when General Tsitsianov was given free rein to embark on a series of
conquests that contributed materially to the outbreak of war; and,
in the postwar negotiations, when General Ermolov persuaded Alex-
ander not to make even a token territorial restoration to Iran.
When Alexander committed the Russian Empire to permanent
and active involvement in Caucasian affairs, he was confident of easy
success. He expected the Caucasians to welcome Russia as their bene-
factor and the Iranians to be incapable of threatening his secure and
prosperous Caucasian domains. Russia, too, would prosper from its
expanded trade with Asia. What he found as he pursued his chosen
course was widespread opposition throughout the area he wished to
control and a decade of war on four fronts that exacted a high toll
in men and money.
Russian Policy: Questions and Continuity 65