would-be khans also tried to use one or both of the competing em-
pires in order to supplant the incumbent. Some khans had very little
room to maneuver because of military weaknesses or the disaffection
of the governed. While the pattern of events after 1801 bore a resem-
blance to the Zubov era, there were also some very important differ-
ences. That year saw the beginning of permanent Russian involve-
ment in the Caucasus. There would be no sudden disengagement as
there had been in 1796. Especially after the arrival of General Tsit-
sianov in 1803, Russia began to employ greater force and in more ex-
treme formes than it had before. At the same time, the Qajar govern-
ment of Iran was in a position to be more assertive of its own claim
to the region.
The period between Paul's decision to annex Georgia and the be-
ginning of Tsitsianov's command was a transitional one in which Rus-
sia tried unsuccessfully to negotiate the submission of three of the four
khanates of Iranian Armenia: Ganjeh, Nakhjavan, and Yerevan.
Events of this period belie the truism that greater contact between
alien cultures always leads to greater understanding and good will.
Lieutenant-General Knorring, who represented Russia in the negotia-
tions, could not understand why the khans were so uncooperative
and ascribed it to malevolence, while the difficulties in the negotia-
tions made the khans increasingly mistrustful of Russia. As a result,
not only were specific points of contention left unresolved but the
whole climate of relations between Russian officials and Caucasian
Muslims worsened.
The essence of the problem was that the khans were looking for
an alliance that would bring them clear benefits in terms of protect-
ing the khanates from conquest by Iran and bolstering the khans'
position in local feuds, but each suspected that the kind of alliance
Russia offered would be one-sidedly in Russia's favor. This ought to
have been a golden opportunity for Russia to achieve an important
part of its objectives in the eastern Caucasus, since each of the three
khans was seriously interested in obtaining Russian protection. Nakh-
javan was weak, vulnerable strategically to an Iranian attack, and at
that particular time, engaged in a dispute with the pasha of Kars.
Yerevan was involved in the same dispute and had been subject to
Iranian attacks aimed at forcing it into submission, most recently in
- Since members of the Georgian royal family were at odds with
Russia, Ganjeh was able to pursue its existing anti-Bagration policy
and give it a pro-Russian coloring by blocking the effort of one of
King Erekle's sons to seize the throne with the help of Avar tribes-
men of the high Caucasus.
Russia's Conquest of the Eastern Caucasus 67