Russia was unable to profit from the favorable situation in Iranian
Armenia because St. Petersburg put a higher priority on interests that
clashed with those of the khans. Given Russia's commitment to Geor-
gian territorial integrity, it could not possibly support the claims of
Ganjeh and Yerevan to the districts along their borders with Georgia.
The alliance between Russia and the Ottoman Empire was an enor-
mously important part of Russia's foreign policy and could not have
been jeopardized by supporting an attack by Yerevan and Nakhjavan
on the border province of Kars. However, the fact that Russia fol-
lowed these policies and the way in which it carried them out guar-
anteeed the failure of negotiations with the khans of Iranian Armenia.
As was often to be the case in Russia activities in the eastern Caucasus,
the actions of officials in the border zone made St. Petersburg's poli-
cies even more aggressive than their superiors had intended. Knorring
showed a certain favorable disposition toward Mohammad Khan of
Yerevan. The frustration of trying to satisfy conflicting interests and
his personal biases drove the general to fulminate against the chosen
scapegoats for his dilemma. Although state policy obliged him to
oppose Yerevani and Ganjevi claims to Georgian border districts, he
received information from Kovalenskii in Tbilisi and the pro-Russian
tribe of Qazzaq Turcomans (who lived along the disputed border)
that indicated there was indeed a historic basis for the two khans'
claims. Knorring would never acknowledge this either to the khans
or to his superiors. In fact, his reports to his superiors cited these
claims as proof of the threat both khans posed to Georgia's security.
He first used this argument as a way to persuade Alexander that fur-
ther delay in the annexation of Georgia exposed it to great peril but
continued to present the khans' motives in a negative light even after
that question had been decided.^2 Whatever the merits of the claims
of Yerevan and Nakhjavan against Kars, Knorring sided with the
pasha to the point of sending Russian troops to defend him from a
Nakhjavani attack. Several hundred of the khan's soldiers were killed
in the battle.
Perhaps the Russians had counted on the three khans' fear of Iran
to make them concede whatever Russia wanted in return for military
protection. The opposite proved to be the case, and the khans turned
away from Russia as a benefactor. Mohammad of Yerevan and Javad
of Ganjeh protested against Russian favoritism, pointing out that the
interests of some of Russia's friends were supported at the expense
of other friends and that the promised benefits of submission to Rus-
sia were illusory. Moreover, they doubted whether Russian protec-
tion would be available no matter what concessions the khans might
68 Russia's Conquest of the Eastern Caucasus