make. In light of a generation of cyclical engagement and disengage-
ment by Russia, many Caucasians must have expected Alexander to
reverse his father's expansionist policy. Kalb 'Ali of Nakhjavan voiced
particular concern over this issue.
3
As a result of all these problems,
the three khans turned against Russia. Javad supported the same
Bagration prince he had lately opposed and died in 1804 while wait-
ing for Iranian tro'ops to save him from Russian conquest. Mohammad
and Kalb 'Ali participated in Iran's Caucasian campaigns of 1802 and
1804.
One of the most striking indications of the Muslims' low estimate
of the value of the Russian presence is that the fourth khan of Iranian
Armenia (Ebrahim Khalil of Qarabagh), who as an ally of Georgia
and a foe of the Qajars should have been the most eager for Russian
protection, did not even try to negotiate an alliance but sided with
Iran instead. He had managed to regain control over Qarabagh after
Aqa Mohammad's assassination, but his realm was so badly weak-
ened by the fighting and natural disasters of the 1790s that he could
no longer be an arbiter of east Caucasian affairs. The khanate was
further depopulated by the emigration of Armenians whom Paul had
invited to settle in an uninhabited district of Georgia. Therefore,
when Fath 'Ali Shah demanded Ebrahim Khalil's submission, the
khan complied with every stipulation, including the sending of a son
as hostage and a daughter to be the shah's wife. (She later became an
influential figure at the Iranian court.) Ebrahim Khalil made the sym-
bolic gesture of submission by minting coins bearing the shah's name.
In return, the alliance brought him demonstrable economic, political,
and military benefits, which Russia seemed unable to offer. The fact
that Aqa Mohammad had conquered Qarabagh twice and that Fath
'Ali repeatedly campaigned in the eastern Caucasus made it seem
plausible that Iran would defend its new ally. Moreover, the shah
helped Ebrahim Khalil compensate for the collapse of Qarabagh's
economy by giving him the revenue of a district across the Aras River.
In 1802, the shah decided he would also support the return to power
of Ebrahim Khalil's ally and son-in-law Salim, who had ruled Shakki
in 1796 and 1797. Ebrahim Khalil not only accepted Iranian suzer-
ainty but also embarked on a course of active hostility toward Russia
and Georgia. He supported a Bagration pretender, raided Georgia
several times, and participated in Fath 'Ali's 1802 campaign.
Thus, at the moment Alexander was ready to launch his new Cau-
casian policy, Russia's prestige there had fallen to a new low. Russia
was not even feared, much less admired as Alexander earnestly hoped
it would be. Knorring occasionally threatened khans with harsh pun-
Russia's Conquest of the Eastern Caucasus 69