the threats to property and physical satety characteristic or Asian rule.
Therefore, for the next thirty years (by which time Russian values
would begin to be absorbed), the only way to deal with new Muslim
subjects was by a policy of stern force because "among the Asians,
nothing works like fear as the natural consequence of force."^18
One of the reasons Tsitsianov resorted so frequently to insults in his
dealings with subordinates and Caucasians was that his extraordinary
ambition was not matched by his achievements. Any officer in his
position would have had to grapple with imposing obstacles, but the
general's own miscalculations increased his problems. His greatest
weakness was his inability to anticipate factors that might stand in
his way. When confronted with the resulting failures, he found scape-
goats, whom he punished severely. These characteristics can be seen
in two closely related events of the summer of 1804: the attempt to
conquer Yerevan and the anti-Russian uprising in Georgia and the high
Caucasus.
For about a year, Tsitsianov had been corresponding with Moham-
mad Khan of Yerevan about the terms of the khan's submission to Rus-
sia. However, the general demanded more than Mohammad was willing
to concede. In addition to terms stipulated by St. Petersburg, such as
the stationing of a Russian garrison in the citadel of Yerevan city, the
general demanded a large annual tribute and increased the amount
when Yerevan rejected the terms so that the final sum was 100,000
rubles (worth at that time more than £15,000). Mohammad was also
under pressure from Fath All Shah to be a more obedient vassal. Tsit-
sianov decided to abandon negotiations and conquer Yerevan. The
fighting, which lasted from July to September, marked the opening
clash in the war between Russia and Iran. After some battles around
the monastery at Echmiadzin in which there was no clear victory for
either side, both armies turned their attention to Yerevan City, which
was besieged by the Russians, who were themselves besieged by a larger
Iranian force. The Iranians fought much more bravely and effectively
than the Russians had expected them to and managed to cut the Rus-
sians off from supplies and reinforcements while the citadel, garrisoned
by the khan's troops and reinforcements from the shah, held off any
direct attacks. While Tsitsianov was in difficulty at Yerevan, an anti-
Russian uprising broke out in Georgia and adjoining districts of the
high mountains. The Georgians had many grounds for dissatisfaction,
including the abolition of Bagration rule, the corruption of Kovalen-
skii's administration, and various actions by Tsitsianov. One of the
most important arguments in favor of the Russian presence was that it
would provide security. However, Tsitsianov made one disastrously un-
76 Russia's Conquest of the Eastern Caucasus