successful attempt in 1803 to stop Lesghi raids from the mountains
northeast of Georgia and then turned his attention to the more attrac-
tive prospect of conquering Ganjeh and Yerevan. The Yerevan cam-
paign left Georgia denuded of troops at at ime when Lesghi raids in-
creased. Many Georgians were further aggrieved by Tsitsianov's use
of peasant labor under extremely harsh conditions to improve the
road across the high mountains. At the same time, a growing number
of Georgians hoped for a Bagration restoration, to which the shah
gave his military support. By September, five of the six generals ac-
companying Tsitsianov decided that his plan to storm Yerevan was
unsound and forced him to abandon the campaign. The Russians re-
turned to Georgia after an arduous journey as the end of summer
brought the traditional campaigning season to a close.
19
Tsitsianov saved his reputation and in the process upheld the validity
of his methods by persuading Alexander that others were to blame
for the year's reverses. Among those at fault were the generals who
refused to storm Yerevan. The khan of that place was also a grave of-
fender. Tsitsianov argued that "the annihiliation of this treacherous
khan" was crucial for Russia's glory and strategic position in the Cau-
casus. The person who bore the greatest share of "guilt," according
to Tsitsianov, was Prince Volkonskii, whose failure to deliver supplies
to the Russians at Yerevan caused the "disgrace" there.^20 (Tsitsianov
did not mention that the Iranian control of the area between Yerevan
and Georgia prevented Russian detachments from traveling between
the two places or that Georgia was short of troops because of the
Yerevan campaign.) These explanations were well received in St. Peters-
burg. Alexander praised Tsitsianov for his zeal in the imperial service
and exonerated him completely. To console the general for his disap-
pointment, the tsar gave him a medal and money. Prince Volkonskii
was recalled. In contrast, when General Gudovich failed in his attempt
to conquer Yerevan in 1808, Alexander called the campaign "stupid"
(though not to Gudovich's face) and sent him into retirement without
a word of consolation.
21
No matter how effectively Tsitsianov shifted the blame for the set-
backs of 1804 onto the shoulders of others, in retrospect it can be
seen that the damage done to Russia's interests by his mistakes was
extremely high. By the end of 1804, war-related deaths, as well as
those caused by diseases contracted in the unfamiliar climate of the
Caucasus, left the Russian force 2,554 men below strength.^22 There is
no reliable information on the extent of civilian casualties or property
destruction, but, given the extent of the fighting and raiding, some
localities were probably hard hit. The issues over which the summer's
Russia's Conquest of the Eastern Caucasus 77