battles had been fought remained unresolved. Georgia and the tribes
of the high Caucasus were only temporarily pacified. In turn, this hin-
dered Russia's efforts to take control of the khanates south and east
of Georgia because it provided new grounds for the existing doubts
about Russia's ability to enforce its demands or to oppose the Iranian
army. At the same time, the harshness of Tsitsianov's methods made
new enemies for Russia.
Tsitsianov's success in persuading St. Petersburg to praise him for
his failures is representative of one of the most curious aspects of his
career in the Caucasus, namely, his influence over Alexander. The tsar's
benign exterior was often taken as a reflection of a malleable nature.
However, his apparent vacillation was used at times as a deceptive ploy
to create the appearance of a favorable atmosphere in which to elicit
the opinions of those around him without revealing his true thoughts.
In the end, Alexander made his own decisions. One of the few officials
whom Alexander permitted to guide him was Tsitsianov. The tsar did
not give him his way in all matters but to a considerable extent did al-
low his advice to guide imperial policy. Tsitsianov evaded inconvenient
orders, afterwards presenting his superiors with a fait accompli and a
carefully edited account of events designed to justify his actions. Alex-
ander had deliberately created a framework within which Tsitsianov
had unusual authority. Faced with a manifestly corrupt and ineffective
administration in a remote corner of his empire, Alexander authorized
the general to take whatever actions he felt were necessary without
his having to request prior approval from St. Petersburg. This approach
could have led to a situation in which the tsar transferred the respon-
sibility for any unsuccessful actions from himself to Tsitsianov, yet the
general was never held accountable for his mistakes and remained in
favor until his death.
One of the areas in which Tsitsianov enjoyed his greatest successes
was in the thwarting of St. Petersburg's policy directives. In 1803 and
1805, he was ordered to limit his activities—in the first case, so that
he could concentrate on making Georgia secure; in the second, so that
Russia could devote its maximum energies to the war against Napoleon.
The general used several tactics to circumvent these limitations. He ar-
gued that it was imperative that he punish Mohammad Khan of Yere-
van (for seizing the Russian candidate for Catholicos of Echmiadzin)
and take Ganjeh (to eliminate the dangers it posed to Georgia). Then,
all the other east Caucasian khanates would also have to be taken to
provide a link to the Caspian and ensure the security of Georgia. At
first, Alexander disagreed but then left the decision up to Tsitsianov
out of respect for the general's knowledge of the region. The general
78 Russia's Conquest of the Eastern Caucasus