also tried to persuade St. Petersburg that his planned expeditions were
worth the effort because they were assured easy victory since the
khans, he said, welcomed Russia as an alternative to Iranian tyranny
and the Iranian army was cowardly and inept. The reverses of 1804
did not cause him to modify these claims. In 1805, once the war with
Iran was a year old, Tsitsianov argued that it was not possible for Russia
to limit itself to defensive actions as his superiors wished because the
only alternative to continuing aggressive warfare was to negotiate a
settlement. However, that was not a realistic alternative because the
shah, according to Tsitsianov's prediction, would never agree to Rus-
sia's territorial demands unless compelled to do so by force of arms.
St. Petersburg accepted this argument as well, even though the direc-
tive that Tsitsianov act only within the scope permitted by his available
resources remained in effect.
23
When it was necessary, Tsitsianov simply evaded St. Petersburg's
restrictions and proceeded with his plans, regardless of orders. There is
no indication that he ever changed his plans to comply with St. Peters-
burg's wishes, and the most striking example of his disobedience was
the expedition to Gilan and Baku. The undertaking was a complete
failure, but not for want of boldness. While Tsitsianov was obtaining
the submission of Qarabagh, Shakki, and Shirvan, Major-General
Zavalishin, with 1,345 officers and men of the Caspian fleet, was to
set sail from Astrakhan to Gilan. These troops were to occupy Anzali
and Rasht until the shah agreed to the harsh and insulting terms con-
tained in a letter from Tsitsianov. If the shah refused the terms, Zavali-
shin was to make Rasht break away from Iran and become a Russian
vassal. Once this was accomplished, Zavalishin was to take Baku. In-
stead of reducing or postponing this expedition once he received the
tsar's order to curtail his activities in 1805, Tsitsianov enlarged its
scope. Not only was Zavalishin to take Rasht, he was also to march
across the Alburz Mountains to Qazvin (100 miles northwest of Tehran
on the main route to Azerbaijan) in order to frighten the shah into
compliance. In addition, Zavalishin was to establish a garrison at Lan-
karan on the Talesh coast.^24
No question of the soundness of Tsitsianov's judgment was per-
mitted during his "reign" or after his death. There were only two at-
tempts to offer St. Petersburg a different evaluation of his actions. One
was a report by Prince Roman Bagration, brother of the general killed
at Borodino. Alexander sent this scion of the Georgian royal family
to Georgia to look after that country's well-being under Russian rule.
Prince Roman was appalled by conditions in Georgia and denounced
Tsitsianov as a tyrant. After the general's death, Prince Roman was re-
Russia's Conquest of the Eastern Caucasus 79