proximity but also because of its decades of hostility toward Georgia.
The fact that Tsitsianov achieved results that pleased him greatly en-
couraged him to continue using the same approach in dealing with the
other khans even though he did not intend to press them all into an
armed confrontation. At the same time, the fate of Ganjeh confirmed
many Muslims' worst fears of Russia's intentions.
Tsitsianov's first move in the takeover of Ganjeh was to demand
Javad Khan's submission in terms that implied that the khan could
not legitimately refuse since he had already submitted in 1796 and
his khanate was traditionally subject to Georgia. The general's specific
requirements intensified Javad's belief that Russia would act against
his best interests. Tsitsianov not only opposed Ganjeh's claim in the
territorial dispute with Georgia, he also took no action against pro-
Georgian inhabitants along the border who raided Ganjeh while he
demanded that the khan make restitution for Ganjevi counterraids.
The general added two particularly ominous stipulations: that Javad
accept a permanent Russian garrison in his capital and that he pay
the disproportionate sum of 20,000 rubles in tribute annually. The
years of Georgian interference in Ganjeh's affairs and Russia's demon-
strated preference for Georgia over Ganjeh must have weighed heavily
on Javad's mind. He rejected the arguments Tsitsianov had used to
justify the demands and showed his concern over Russian hostility
by pointing out that his submission in 1796 had been obtained under
duress but that at least Catherine had sent him an official patent of
office. None was forthcoming in 1803. He closed on a note of defiance,
stating that, when he had submitted before, the Iranian army had been
far away but now, "thank God!" it was close at hand to protect him
from Russia.^27 Tsitsianov made no effort to allay Javad's fears; the
only alternative left was war.
Late in 1803, Tsitsianov invaded Ganjeh. He marched unopposed to
the immediate vicinity of the capital, where Javad attempted unsuc-
cessfully to block his advance. The khan then withdrew to his citadel,
and a month-long siege began. The Ganjevis were cut off from their
supplies of water and firewood; the Russians ran short of food and
fell ill in large numbers from drinking the local water. As the siege
wore on, an Iranian army under the command of the shah's favored
son, 'Abbas Mirza, marched to Javad's aid. Unable to continue the
siege but unwilling to retreat, Tsitsianov ordered the storming of the
citadel at dawn on January 15,1804. At first, the defenders were able
to repel the onslaught, but in the end the Russians broke through.
Javad, his son Hosin Qoli, and several other relatives were killed in
battle and with them many other Ganjevis. Tsitsianov put the number
(^82) Russia's Conquest of the Eastern Caucasus