M.S. Adolphson
781–806) with support from leading members of the Northern Fujiwara. Even though Kanmu’s
son, Heizei (774–824, r. 806–809), who had retired earlier because of health issues, rebelled against
his younger brother Saga (786–842, r. 809–823) in 810 in the so- called Kusuko Incident, the impe-
rial family maintained strong control over the court and state matters for another half a century by
relying on the legal codes adopted from China.^1 Historians generally refer to this “statutory regime”
of the Nara and the early Heian age as the ritsuryō (penal and administrative code) state, to reflect a
strong reliance on the law codes and the formal bureaucratic structure.^2 Subsequent centuries,
however, saw substantial changes in the political structures, even as the general framework centered
on the imperial court remained. Scholars have identified two major transitions, one in the second
half of the ninth century and one in the tenth. Though these changes can be seen as connected to the
same overall trend of increased reliance on private connections and assets, putting primacy on one
over the other has serious implications for how we view the developments of the early Heian age.
A closer examination of each of these transitions is thus warranted.
Following the move of the capital, the most momentous event in the ninth century occurred
in 858, when a young emperor (Seiwa, 850–880, r. 858–876) of only eight was put on the throne,
ushering in an age of rule through regents. His grandfather, Fujiwara no Yoshifusa (804–872),
assumed the title of sesshō (regent), thus becoming the first person not hailing from the imperial
family to do so. Yoshifusa’s adopted son, Mototsune (836–891), continued to dominate the
imperial succession to ensure his influence as regent, though he later ran into problems with
Emperor Uda (867–931, r. 887–897), who ascended the throne as an adult in 887. Mototsune
solved this problem after a brief power struggle known as the Akō no fungi (the Akō Controversy)
by assuming a new title: kanpaku, or regent for an adult emperor. For the next two centuries, the
imperial court was dominated by a series of Fujiwara chieftains, which has given rise to the notion
of a regency age (sekkanke jidai).^3
The socio- political context that made the regency possible can only be properly understood
when examined from the very pinnacle of the imperial state: the throne itself and the succession
to it. In medieval Europe, it was common practice that the first- born son inherit the throne,
although there were both exceptions and challenges to that principle.^4 In Japan, such a principle
was absent, meaning that the oldest son was not necessarily the preferred candidate for the throne.
This arrangement was created because of a strong desire to produce able, male heirs. Up until the
mid- eighth century, women had in fact been active both as co- rulers with their spouses and as
monarchs in their own right, but they were in practice, if not in principle, excluded from the
throne after the death in 770 of Empress Shōtoku (718–770, r. 749–758; later as Kōken,
r. 764–770), who had battled against the Fujiwara and asserted her own power with the help of
a skillful monk named Dōkyō (700?–772).^5
With daughters no longer seen as viable candidates for the throne after the late eighth century,
sovereigns maintained several consorts to increase the likelihood of having at least one son. The
problem with such an arrangement, if it was tied to primogeniture, was that an insignificant
consort might be the first to have a son, who in turn would lack support to rule. Or, the first-
born son might simply be frail and thus unlikely to be a force at court, and might not be able to
produce any offspring, which would have jeopardized the imperial line itself. In contrast, by
allowing numerous candidates to the throne, the continuation of the imperial line could be
secured, but by the same token, there was a great chance that there would also be competition
among several eligible candidates. In that context, the candidate with the strongest support in the
capital had a distinct advantage, as the social status and political backing of the imperial consort
trumped birthright based on age.
In essence, then, the imperial succession could very well be up in the air until late in any given
emperor’s life, depending on who had produced sons among his consorts. Nevertheless, if the